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In an effort to illuminate the way institutional changes are led by ideas 
and discursive politics in an open economy, this thesis examines how Brexit 
was developed by the ideas and discourses of international and domestic 
politics.  
Brexit cannot be understood by the existing theoretical frameworks that 
overlook the interactions of political actors and noneconomic factors. First, 
neither the class interests of comparative historicists nor the institutional 
interests of neoinstitutionalists could explain the recent Brexit decision. 
Although historicists and institutionalists consider the interests of political 
actors as predetermined and fixed, the British actors had gradually adjusted 
their understanding, interests, and preferences on foreign policy without 
class restructuring or external shocks. Second, an economic analysis of 
Brexit does not correspond to the actual decision of the actors. The UK 
decided to leave the EU even though the expected impacts of Brexit were 
pessimistic to its national economy. 
In addition to deficiencies in the existing theoretical frameworks, an 
inconsistency of foreign policy in the UK has challenged many 
comparativists. The current thesis defines a pattern of the UK–EU 
relationship as a stop-go one. Although during the postwar era the UK 
increasingly promoted the general trend against European integration, its 
foreign policy alternated between reluctant participation and breakaway.  
The key argument of this thesis is that Brexit was catalyzed by a 
discursive politics of ideas, not by a cost-benefit analysis of the 
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predetermined interests of actors. The thesis suggests the concept of the 
Brexit Idea to capture a few of the thoughts and discourses proliferated 
during Brexit. In the face of socioeconomic challenges after the 2000s, 
European countries shared a discourse on the inequalities between nation-
states and domestic coalitions. Through this inequality discourse, shared 
understandings of neonationalism, Euroscepticism, and deglobalization 
were formulated and constituted the Brexit Idea, which was conducive to the 
UK leaving the EU. Moreover, the concept of the Brexit Idea is analyzed by 
looking at internal and external fragility. Although the Brexit Idea made a 
strong demand on initiating related discourses and actual behaviors, it did 
not provide a dominant framework with which to interpret the problematic 
situations and interests of actors and was open to the political competition of 
actors. Brexit was finally chosen because the proleave group was more 
efficient in diffusing its interpretive framework on the Brexit Idea. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) astonished the world on June, 23 2016 
when it decided to leave the European Union (EU) through a referendum. 
Because the UK was known for its path dependent institution and hesitant 
policy making, the divorce from the EU caught the attention of 
comparativists from all over the world. It was the causes behind Brexit that 
they especially focused on. Because the relationship between the UK and 
the EU has been distinctively established along British history, it was hardly 
straightforward to suggest the causes of Brexit.  
The objective of the current thesis is to investigate how the Brexit Idea 
was formulated and mobilized and then to understand the domestic 
institutional changes by looking at the ideational factors in an open economy, 
here based on the endogenous institutional change theory and ideational 
approach. Thus, the current thesis asks the following: How can we 
understand complicated causes and the process of Brexit by using an 
ideational approach? If the Brexit Idea played a critical role during Brexit, 
how was it formulated and proliferated? What is a feature of the Brexit 
Idea? Finally, in an open economy, how do ideas lead to domestic 
institutional changes? 
The main argument of the present thesis is that the Brexit Idea served 
as an impetus to leave the EU, yet its internal fragility caused political 
gridlock after the referendum. The relationship between the EU and the UK, 
from incipient hostility to sophisticated Euroscepticism, formed the 
institutional background of Brexit in historical terms. According to the 
current thesis, European countries underwent a series of socioeconomic 
 
 ２ 
challenges after the 1990s and dealt with the problems together, which led to 
a recognition of inequality not only among the EU member states but also 
between domestic actors. Ideas of deglobalization, Euroscepticism, and 
neonationalism flourished, respectively, at the international, European, and 
domestic levels because of inequality discourses. Finally, the Brexit Idea 
was formulated and utilized in the UK. Yet the Brexit Idea was internally 
fragile because of its hardly agreed-upon premises: the effect of 
globalization and regional integration on European countries. This 
ideational fragility brought about the Brexit decision only with a minute 
margin of vote and a gridlock in domestic politics with high uncertainty.  
In sum, the current thesis suggests a concept of the Brexit Idea that 
stresses the interaction between domestic and international politics and 
discursive politics between actors as a crucial explanatory variable of Brexit 
and its aftermath. The case of Brexit implies that an idea formulated at the 
international level can change a domestic institution in an open economy by 
mobilizing domestic actors around its related discourses. Specifically, the 
characters of an idea, such as internal and external fragility, work for the 
possibility of domestic institutional changes.  
The present thesis indicates that the literature on institutional change 
often overlooks the interactions between international and domestic actors, 
only looking at the economic factor. First, the literature assumes that the 
interests of political actors are largely defined by their socioeconomic 
positions and institutions. With this assumption, past arguments hardly 
manage to explain dynamic discursive interactions, a reorganization of 
interests, and any endogenous institutional changes. Comparative 
historicism and neoinstitutionalism, which represent the literature on a 
domestic political economy, consider that the interests of political actors are 
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given by their economic and institutional position, respectively. On the one 
hand, comparative historicists argue that classes are constructed by a large 
flow of history, and thus, actors conform to the class interests and roles 
given to them by history (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; Luebbert 1987; 
Rueschemeyer 1992). Neoinstitutionalists, on the other hand, share an 
assumption that the current institutions impose restrictions on the interests, 
behaviors, and policy decisions of actors despite these institutions’ 
subdivision into historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, 
behavioral institutionalism, or others (Hall 1986; Hall and Soskice 2001; 
Schmidt 2002; Blyth 2002; Fioretos 2011). An analysis of most literature 
fails to explain the actual decision of actors because it disregards the actual 
process of politics, such as the development of political narratives, 
competing paradigms, and sharing a cognitive understanding. 
In the case of Brexit, the literature does not consider political 
discourses and is not able to propose congruent explanations in both vertical 
and horizontal terms. The UK has kept the liberal market economy (LME) 
system after World War II, except for a short period of having an 
interventionist state and collectivistic growth during the 1970s (Kesselman 
2006). The LME system was particularly stressed after Thatcher seized 
power. Furthermore, the rapid growth of the British economy was expected 
with the accelerated pace of globalization in the 1990s. This was because 
globalization and economic neoliberalism were thought to be 
complementary with the British LME system. Notwithstanding the 
continuous institutional complementarity between the British LME system 
and the international economy, the UK showed fickleness in European 
policy. This is the point where comparativists have difficulty explaining 
institutional changes.  
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Right after World War II, the British government tried to check the 
European Economic Community (EEC) by establishing the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). Owing to the failure of the EFTA, the UK had to 
strive to join the EEC three times, the first two of which were vetoed by the 
former French President, Charles De Gaulle. After gaining its membership 
to the EEC, the UK held the 1975 referendum to confirm its membership in 
domestic society, giving an indication of reversing its decision about EEC 
membership. After that, the UK opposed the creation of the EU, declined to 
join the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) but joined the EU, 
and finally withdrew from the EU.  
This erratic nature of British foreign policy cannot be easily understood 
by most political economic literature, which overlooks the interaction of 
political actors and rules out a possibility of endogenous changes. The fact 
that the LME system continued after the war refutes the argument 
attributing institutional changes to the exogenous shocks, as the punctuated 
equilibrium theory suggests. Furthermore, the emphasis on traditional 
institutional paths and exogenous crises also leads to overlooked dynamic 
interactions. In sum, most of the literature on institutional changes could be 
criticized as considering the interests of political actors as being ascribed 
and thus closing any possibility of endogenous institutional changes, here 
ignoring the discursive interactions between actors.  
On the other hand, an international political analysis on domestic 
institutions does not clearly analyze the causes and processes of Brexit. 
International political scientists considered Brexit to be a collateral effect of 
restructuring international relations after full-out globalization rather than a 
self-generated institutional change. For instance, there is an argument that 
the liberal order of the international system and the history of international 
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integration driven by Western advanced capitalism is coming to an end. 
Instead, nationalism, protectionism, and neoauthoritarianism have emerged 
as dominant political doctrines of which Brexit is an example (Ikenberry 
2018). Yet this argument does not include the effects of international politics 
on domestic political processes, instead merely considering the politics of 
international relations. In other words, a dichotomous perspective between 
international and domestic politics as a divided container particularly 
perplexes international political scientists when studying recent institutional 
changes. 
Second, the current thesis suggests that many studies on institutional 
changes stick to only economic variables. After the development of 
capitalism, the interests of nation-states have been exhaustively defined by 
economic interests, and thus, the goal of every nation-state has been to seek 
economic wealth and growth. Accordingly, every social problem has been 
reduced into the subject of economic adjustments. Institutional efficiency 
has been explicitly equated with the creation of economic profits. When it 
comes to foreign policy, explanations from an economic point of view seem 
to be dominant (Hall 1986). For example, Brexit was found to be a 
complementary institutional of the LME system with the aim to obtain 
economic profits using the LME system.  
Still, the economic approach has a main drawback in explaining Brexit 
in that Brexit disagrees with the continuous institutional path and thus has 
resulted in economic losses. Although the interest system of the British 
actors was unchanged under the identical economic model, the decision to 
leave the EU was made without exogenous shocks. In other words, the 
economic approach has a limitation in offering the plausible causes behind 




In the British LME, markets and economic policy are adjusted through 
competition and contracts between private actors without any intervention 
from the political realm (Shonfield 1965; Cohen 1977; Zysman 1983; Hall 
and Soskice 2001). Not surprisingly, the British economy showed hostility 
against any restrictions on private actors and movements of goods and 
capital, particularly those imposed by regional political communities 
(Krieger 2006).  
A decision to leave the EU hurt the UK’s economic efficiency in that 
the UK would deviate from a free trade policy assured by a common market 
of the EU and its built-in protectionism. This implies that the British 
economy should abandon the advantages offered by the LME system 
because the existing institutions of the British market system and 
protectionism would conflict and produce inefficiency. This contradictory 
decision cannot be found in the existing literature, which explains an 
institutional change from the perspective of economic adjustments.  
In addition, studies sticking to an economic variable have problems 
analyzing institutional changes after globalization, especially those changes 
that were largely engendered by other factors. There is no way to account 
for institutions that are inconsistent with a cost-benefit analysis. According 
to the HM Treasury, Brexit was not supported by a cost-benefit analysis: 
trade balance deficit, decreasing job opportunities, and a slowing economic 
growth rate were expected (HM Treasury 2016)①. Nonetheless, Brexit 
                                            
① According to the report by the HM Treasury, a decision to leave the EU has three 
feasible options regarding its relationships, as follows: to have a membership in the EEA 
(European Economic Area) like the Norwegian model, to be under a negotiated bilateral 
agreement like Swiss, Turkey, and Canada, or to have a membership in the WTO (World 
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occurred even with economic causalities, which indicates an oversight over 
the economic factors during the policy-making process. 
As a noneconomic factor, there has been a rearrangement of the 
socioeconomic structure after the 2015 European Migrant Crisis, increasing 
economic inequalities between social groups following a growth of the 
British economy, reformation of the decision-making mechanisms, and so 
on. All of these noneconomic factors also came under consideration in 
Brexit. Moreover, new questions about the social virtues, such as social 
integration, inequality, and so forth, were subjected to commitments on 
propriety and correctness rather than economic adjustments. Thus, in terms 
of its noneconomic causes and virtues, Brexit is inexplicable when trying to 
be explained by conventional descriptions such as comparative historicism 
and neoinstitutionalism, which perceive that the interests of actors are 
constructed a priori based on an economic position and institutions and 
which take an interest-centered approach.  
Therefore, the current thesis focuses on the discursive interactions 
between actors and endogenous institutional changes that occur because of 
noneconomic variables, hence accounting for why and how the UK 
determined to leave the EU. To achieve these goals, the present thesis will 
                                                                                                               
Trade Organization) without other agreements with the EU. The report suggests a long-term 
economic expectation of Brexit in 15 years depending on the type of relationship the UK 
will take. For instance, the GDP level is expected to drop by 3.8% in the EEA, 6.2% in a 
negotiated bilateral agreement, 7.5% in the WTO. The GDP per capita is predicted to 
decrease £1,100, £1,800, and £2,100, respectively. The amount of the decrease on the net 
impact on receipts is estimated to reach £2 million, £3.6 million, and £4.5 million in each 
case, respectively. In brief, the report points out that a decision to leave the EU may move 
toward the impoverishment of the UK (HM Treasury 2016). 
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adopt and develop the endogenous institutional change theory as an 
alternative perspective. As one offshoot of historical institutionalism, the 
endogenous institutional change theory stresses a variety of individual ideas 
and reinterpretation of ideas that take place during political interactions 
(Blyth 2002; Schmidt 2008; Herrigel 2010; Kwon 2013; Thelen 2004). 
Although the punctuated equilibrium theory and path dependency argument 
attribute Brexit to the international economic crisis and continuity of the 
LME system, the endogenous institutional change theory proposes the 
possibility of institutional changes by repeated interactions and everyday 
politics.  
Based on the endogenous institutional change theory, the current thesis 
will show that the Brexit Idea was formulated through international political 
discourses during socioeconomic challenges and the responses of the 
European community. The Brexit Idea became an interpretation framework 
based on which social actors could understand problematic situations and 
modify their interests. A new coalition and diverging lines emerged in 
domestic politics. Indeed, the Brexit Idea and rearrangement of domestic 
politics led to Brexit.  
In brief, the current thesis will constitute a concept of the Brexit Idea 
and closely examine the interactions and mobilization among various social 
actors. An idea is distinct from the concept of interests claimed by 
comparative historicism or neoinstitutionalism in that there is room for 
internal creation, change, and abolition of ideas by discursive interactions. 
Although interests are defined a priori by socioeconomic positions and 
institutional environments and are closed to individual reinterpretation, the 
interactions and discourses of everyday politics may have an impact on 
ideas because ideas require the behaviors and discourses of actors. Hence, a 
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theory with ideational variables could explain institutional changes without 
any external shocks, instead doing so with gradual institutional changes 
throughout the process of daily politics. Furthermore, ideas often fall into 
the realm of floating resources, of which social actors can take advantage of 
their dynamic and flexible nature. In opposition, interests are occupied and 
controlled to a disparate extent because interests are based on unchanging 
socioeconomic positions. 
The fact that the current thesis is based on the concept of ideas and 
discursive interactions bespeaks its merits in grasping institutional changes 
without an intervention of external variables, such as global economic crisis, 
regime changes, and so forth. We could also observe institutional transitions 
between times or countries in so far as ideas and discursive interactions are 
valid comparative tools. Although other conditions differ between different 
time periods or societies, a comparative study can be attempted using the 
concept of discursive interactions, reinterpretation of ideas, and institutional 
changes.  
 
To investigate the development of the Brexit Idea and Brexit, the 
current thesis consists of four parts. Chapter two reviews a few dominating 
studies on institutional changes, including those using the comparative 
historicism, neoinstitutionalism, and international political theories. This 
chapter examines the existing literature on institutional changes and their 
direction in the political realm. In the present thesis, Brexit is considered an 
institution taking the form of foreign policy. Next, an alternative theory and 
analytic framework is proposed based on critical literature reviews. 
Theoretical premises and key conceptions, such as the Brexit Idea and 
internal and external fragility, are thoroughly dealt with.  
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Chapter three investigates the peculiarity of British foreign policy 
toward the European community after World War II all the way to Brexit. 
How a sentiment of an unfledged hostility developed into a sophisticated 
ideational framework of Euroscepticism is traced in comparative historical 
terms. The historical path of the British foreign policy becomes a reference 
point with which to understand Brexit. Before proposing an argument, 
chapter three catches the distinctiveness of the British foreign policy, 
distinguishing it from other time periods and countries. In short, a so-called 
“stop-go” in macroeconomic policy was also adopted in foreign policy (Hall 
1986). The UK has shown a tendency to arbitrarily choose a position toward 
the European community depending on the time. It actively engaged in 
European regional integration, but it also deviated from the European 
community, not sharing in all of its burdens.  
Chapter four addresses how the Brexit Idea came into being. First, the 
European community went under socioeconomic challenges and repeated 
responses against certain challenges: the European Debt Crisis and the 
European Migrant Crisis in 2015. It was these international discourses that 
the process of sharing understandings on the current inequalities was held. 
The main points of the inequality discourse are the sovereignty and 
economic gaps among EU member nations and social actors. The current 
thesis asserts that three pillars of the Brexit Idea were constructed through 
prevalent international discourses on these inequalities: deglobalization at an 
international level, Euroscepticism at a regional level, and neonationalism at 
a national level, all of which are the shifting incentives of actors.  
In addition, chapter four captures the nature of the Brexit Idea before 
discussing the endogenous institutional changes in chapter five. This chapter 
looks at the ironic but remarkable aspects of the Brexit Idea, which worked 
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to initiate deliberation and public discussions on related themes, even 
making these interactions inevitable. Here, the Idea was solid and secure 
and seems to be the new dividing line in European society. Meanwhile, the 
Brexit Idea had a fragile and volatile character in that its meaning was 
entirely subjected to the individual and voluntary reinterpretation of actors. 
The Idea could be understood as a fixed concept when it comes to its 
contents and implications.  
In short, the existence of the Brexit Idea itself is established and secure, 
while its contents are fully fragile and left open to reinterpretations. These 
features are expressed as externally solid but internally fragile. Dealing with 
these features, chapter four suggests why and how these features were first 
embedded in the Idea. The argument revolves around a discussion on 
globalization and regional integration. 
Chapter five examines how political coalitions utilized the Brexit Idea 
to mobilize actors and struggle against each other. Beyond the conventional 
divides between Whig and Tory, the current thesis suggests a conflict 
between the pro- and anti-European integration as the possibly new cleavage 
in the UK; it signifies a rearrangement of social actors and party systems in 
response to this new line. Most political forces did not well utilize the Brexit 
Idea to mobilize British actors and to build a dominating coalition. Finally, 
chapter five endeavors to find a relationship between the ideas and 
institutional changes in an open economy. Although we cannot conclude 
how ideas determine the direction of institutional changes, it is evident that 
ideas involve collective deliberation and public discourses that could be the 
seed of institutional changes. 
Finally, a conclusion chapter briefly goes over the argument, taking into 
account its implication for an adaptation of nation-states toward globalizing 
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Chapter 2. Debates on Institutional Changes 
 
In January 2013, former Prime Minister David Cameron publicly 
promised to hold the Brexit referendum if the Conservative Party won the 
2015 general election. In response to it, the leader of the Labour Party, Ed 
Miliband, denounced the announcement as a “huge gamble,” and Brexit 
debates rapidly heated up in the UK. Political comparativists also began to 
study how Brexit would affect the British and European economies and 
whether Brexit would pass or not. These studies mainly concentrated on 
proposing the economic effects of Brexit in a quantitative form, a reason 
why many existing studies have failed to describe the dynamic changes in 
politics and the economies of member countries. In addition, a mounting 
sense of crisis was rampant because of worldwide economic recession, 
rising far-right populism, the European Migrant Crisis, and sharply 
transforming politics of the UK and the European community. Thus, many 
comparative studies kept focusing on how British politics unfolded without 
much consideration of the inherent theoretical flaws. 
After the watershed of the Brexit referendum, the focus of Brexit 
debates suddenly shifted. After the UK confirmed leaving the EU in two 
years according to Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, how Brexit discourses 
first arose or how the European integration would change in the future came 
to be actively discussed②. Despite shifting focal points, most studies still 
                                            
② Brexit was investigated from the perspective of party politics, political culture, and 
economic wealth. First, Brexit is attributed to the malfunction of old party system and the 
weakness of the Conservative and the Labour party (Ford and Goodwin 2017; Jessop 2017; 
Morgan 2017). After globalization, interests of domestic actors have diversified. And 
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concentrated on the economic causes and repercussions of the phenomenon. 
To make matters worse, their analysis overlooked the dynamic interactions 
of the actors and their international and domestic perspectives and the 
gradual changes in the political economic features of member states, which 
could be substantive resources of institutional change. Consequently, these 
studies have been unsuccessful at achieving an integrated explanation of the 
causes and effects of Brexit.  
If we understand Brexit at a more fundamental level, this practical case 
could be paralleled with the theoretical disputes on institutional changes and 
their appearances. Varieties of Capitalism school (VOC) after the 1990s has 
                                                                                                               
interactions between globalization and an attempt to europeanize have taken on the 
complicated dimension. Nevertheless, traditional two-party system merely polarized this 
complex issue into either stay or leave option. Moreover, both the Conservative and the 
Labour party experienced the internal division and did not overcame disappointment of 
voters. These facts imply a failure of conventional parties in reforming conventional 
political institutions and in resolving a conflict among voters. Therefore, it is suggested that 
Brexit referendum was a part of democratic institutions which display nonconfidence on 
existing politicians and political system.  
    Second, a rapid globalization, increasing immigrants, terrorism, and far right populism 
receive attention as an engine of Brexit (Hobolt 2016; Balibar 2016). The far right parties 
insist that decades of extensive globalization have disparately affected to gains and losses 
of the domestic groups with a new social cleavage. They aimed to transform this argument 
into a fear against other countries, races, or classes, and to mobilize voters. The far right 
populists like UK Independence Party effectively appropriated Euroscepticism and a 
referendum. 
 Third, it is argued that economic factors triggered the British de facto skepticism 
about international economic integration (Margalit 2012). The economic globalization 
represented by the EU has been deemed to increase wage disparity and welfare differential 
in domestic societies and between member states. 
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studied the diversification of institutions by political economic models, the 
features of each model as a reason for institutional diversification, and the 
conditions for institutional development. Under the context of VOC, Brexit 
could be studied as a diversification of the British institution from the past 
or from another country. Therefore, it is indispensable to review the 
literature on when, how, and why institutions change.  
Furthermore, Brexit as a foreign policy signifies an institutional change 
led by international politics in the era of globalization. Because after 
globalization domestic institutions could be altered by international political 
variables rather than domestic factors, disputes on the causes of institutional 
reform have no choice but to develop beyond the border of nation-states. 
Likewise, this is partially because of the complexity of institutional reforms 
stemming from globalization, meaning that the studies focusing on political 
outcomes should be closely examined. 
The dominant ways to explain the mechanism behind producing 
political outcomes, such as policy, regime change, or so forth could be 
divided into a political economic approach and an international political 
approach. As a representative case of the political economic approach, 
comparative historicists insist that multiple classes are constructed through 
the interests and relationships between classes and that the relationship 
between classes decides political outcomes (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; 
Rueschemeyer 1986; Gourevitch 1986). For instance, prodemocratic 
laborers, antidemocratic landlords, and capitals build their own coalitions. 
The balance of class power decides the political outcomes of the society 
(Rueschmeyer 1986). Because comparative historicists suppose that the 
interests of actors are determined by economic positions, their explanation 
excludes a case where variables other than interests drive political changes. 
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Although the negative economic effects of Brexit were predicted and that 
the class system was not restructured in the UK, British voters chose to 
leave the EU. Here, a comparative historical description falters. 
Neoinstitutionalists commonly maintain that a set of institutions settle a 
policy path, notwithstanding its internal differentiation into historical 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, behavioral institutionalism, 
and so on (Weir and Skocpol 1985; Katzenstein; Gourevitch 1986; Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2008; Blyth 2002; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Pierson 
2004; Levi 2009; Hay 2006; Fioretos 2001). The path dependent way of 
development can be sustained because institutional conditions constrain the 
choice of actors in favor of existing institutions. This approach, however, 
excessively sticks to the continuity of institutions, which often betrays a real 
choice. For example, existing neoinstitutional studies seem to preclude 
giving explanations for the UK’s decision: to deviate from the common 
market, to withdraw support from the LME system in an international trade 
area, and to choose a protective trade frequently dubbed economic 
nationalism. The reason for the UK shifting from joining the EU to 
withdrawing from it is beyond description when it comes to 
neoconstitutionalism.  
Meanwhile, the international political approach explains domestic 
political outcomes by looking at structural pressures from international 
relations (Gerschenkron 1963; Kurth 1979a; Wallerstein 1974; Gilpin 1975; 
Krasner 1976; Allison 1969; Nye and Geohane 1971). Yet this approach 
leaves out the actual political process for political outcomes. This implies 
that the direction of political changes is still blank.  
If so, how can we understand Brexit when looking at the influence of 
international and domestic interactions and of complicated economic and 
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institutional factors? How could the political economic model of the UK be 
interpreted in the case of Brexit? Which theoretical perspectives could 
replenish the existing studies that have fixated on economic interests and/or 
international structures?  
The current thesis suggests that institutional reform occurs because of 
the politics of domestic coalitions under the constraints of institutional 
environments. In this regard, the viewpoint of the present thesis is in the 
same vein as comparative historicism and neoinstitutionalism. Yet the 
current thesis focuses less on institutional and economic interests and more 
on the ideas crossing these factors and on the discourses and interactions 
where ideas are grown. What decided Brexit was not just the interests of the 
British economy or LME system themselves, but rather the Brexit Idea and 
international discourses used to interpret the established institutions. The 
current thesis also closely observes the actual behaviors of actors to interpret 
their interests, which leads to the endogenous institutional change. 
This chapter explores the prevalent theories on producing political 
outcomes, including comparative historicism, neoinstitutionalism, and key 
international political theories. Then, the theoretical framework of the 
current thesis is presented. 
 
2.1. Comparative Historicism 
 
Comparative historicists argue that the transition of a political system is 
determined by the power struggle between domestic coalitions based on 
actors’ interests (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; Rueschemeyer 1986; 
Gourevitch 1986). Each class shows interest-specific behaviors because 
 
 １８ 
economic positions construct these interests and the classes of the actors. 
Every class strives to compose a coalition and to mobilize power to achieve 
their desired outcomes. A specific path of political development could be 
adopted following a power struggle between classes. For example, when 
there is a strong bourgeois impulse, a society progresses toward democracy 
by means of a bourgeois revolution. France had a societal structure where 
the bourgeois class led an agrarian one, which was the seed for a bourgeois 
revolution. In contrast, with a powerful landed upper class, the bourgeois is 
subordinated to the landed upper class, and there is a strong possibility for 
fascism by revolution from above (Moore 1966). 
In the same line of thought, in the case of an economic crisis, the 
government employs policy by considering the production profile. To be 
concrete, the political actors, such as business, labor, and agriculture, shape 
political preferences based on their production profile. Political preferences 
play a role in constituting domestic coalitions and when applying pressures 
to the government during policy making. For example, the British 
government implemented a free trade policy in the late 1800s because the 
production profile of industry, agriculture, landowner, aristocrat, and labor 
was favorable to free trade (Gourevitch 1986).  
Although comparative historicists assume that the interests of actors 
are predetermined by economic positions, interests are neither defined by 
economic position nor constructed a priori. After the development of 
capitalism in Germany, although the state was seized not by landlords but by 
labors, it failed to move forward to democracy (Moore 1966). The German 
case cannot be fully understood with the hypothesis that landlords are 
antidemocratic and that laborers are prodemocratic. As such, the actual 
behaviors of the German landlords and labors readily disapprove the 
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argument that interests are defined a priori. 
The fallacy of comparative historicism is also found in the case where 
behaviors are endogenously modified by the changes of a socially shared 
understanding, priority of virtues, and way of thinking despite having a 
consistent class structure. This fallacy demonstrates an incompetence of the 
theoretical perspective, which is common with functionalism. Comparative 
historicists cannot explain the self-reinforcement and self-destruction of 
institutions under a coherent systemic environment. Likewise, functionalists 
maintain that institutions are created, reformed, and abandoned following 
the roles and necessity of a system without recognizing the possibility of 
self-generated institutions.  
In the case of Brexit, the interests of the actors did not agree with their 
economic position, and the actors did not act based on their economic 
interests. The British Treasury predicted a GDP decrease of 3–7% as a 
possible effect of Brexit. Negative economic effects were also found in 
many indicators, such as per capita income, unemployment rate, direct 
investment rate, and so forth (HM Treasury 2016). The Brexit decision 
insinuates that the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and voters in 
general had criteria other than economic adjustments. Moreover, although 
reorganization of the class structure did not occur before and after 2016, the 
actual choice of the actors shifted from staying to leaving, something 
comparative historicists cannot explain.  
Comparative historicism also is weak in describing the dynamics of a 
change and transition inside the political system. It lacks a process-
mechanism analysis. For instance, Gourevitch (1986) examined the power 
struggle among class coalitions with an emphasis on domestic politics for 
policy making. Yet his analysis did not set a relationship between five 
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variables③ when multiple variables conflicted for class interests. In effect, 
he consistently emphasized the production profile for his case study of the 
UK, France, and Germany. However, four variables, save for the production 
profile, are considered as not having the same degree of explanatory power. 
The strong point of this analysis is at the systemic level but omits the 
political process of establishing interests and its dynamism.  
The problem with a lack of political process is that the real agency of 
actors does not exist. In the actual process of political implementation, 
actors actively reinterpret their interests by understanding and demanding 
policy. In a comparative historicist explanation, however, policy-making 
mechanisms that have a regular pattern of interactions are largely ignored 
because of the absence of active players.  
When it comes to Brexit, multiple socioeconomic variables were taken 
into account, such as economic effects, traditional political systems such as 
the two-party system and parliamentary system, immigrant inflow, 
expansion of far-right populism, enthusiasm for democratic ideals, and the 
EU’s cooperation demand to recover the economy. Many studies point out 
the negative economic predictions, changing political culture with 
increasing amount of immigrants, and a growing far-right party as the cause 
of Brexit. Yet they are obsessed with only a few variables and do not try to 
use a holistic and integrated view. Moreover, the real agency of political 
                                            
③ Gourevitch suggested five feasible policy options against economic crisis: classical 
liberalism, socialization and planning, protectionism, demand stimulus, and mercantilism. 
Actors shape their preferences based on their production profile, intermediate associations, 
state structure, economic ideology, and international system. Following their preferences, 
domestic coalitions are established, and the power struggles among them lead to the final 
policy decision (Gourevitch 1986). 
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actions such the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and the City is 
prominent in the case of Brexit. These facts illuminate a necessity to 
understand the political process and how it crosses multiple variables. 
Finally, comparative historicists are inclined to treat political systems 
as containers that are isolated from others or from international systems. 
When we understand domestic politics as isolated, numerous interplays 
between political systems may slip out of our analysis. For example, after 
the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993, the EU expanded its 
influence over Europe, and the interactions between the supranational 
regime and nation-states arose exponentially. After the 1990s, the EU 
became a dominant order in Europe. In this case, there must be a deficiency 
in perceiving each nation’s politics as isolated, without looking at political 
interactions. 
Brexit has both domestic and international features because it is a 
domestically enacted policy that deals with a supranational community. 
Although Brexit was born through a domestic policy-making mechanism, 
we cannot neglect the structural pressures from the UK’s relationship with 
the EU: the EU asked the UK to increase its share of expenses, to cooperate 
and accept more immigrants, and so forth. In other words, it implies that we 
should look at the perspective of dynamic interactions to discover the 




Neoinstitutionalists emerged after the 1990s, criticizing the fact that 
functionalists and comparative historicists hardly observe changes and the 
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differentiation of institutions by country and society. To capture the varying 
aspects of institutions, neoinstitutionalists suggested new analytical methods. 
At the same time, neoinstitutionalists also refuted the argument of 
neoliberals. Whereas neoliberals argued liberalism was a universal path of 
economic development (Strange 1997; Rodrik 1997; Friedman 2006; 
Bhagwati 2010), neoinstitutionalists found an institutional reform to be path 
dependent. Because institutions decide the interests of political actors, the 
paths of development would self-reinforce and follow the established 
institution. 
The neoinstitutional theory can be divided into a few streams: 
historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and behavioral 
institutionalism. Historical institutionalists suppose that the interests of 
actors are defined by the historical arrangements of institutions, and thus, 
political systems or institutions must have been around for a while before 
any external shock can happen (Katzenstein 1978; Berger 1981; Weir and 
Skocpol 1985; Hall 1986; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Once a specific 
system and institutions settle down, they fix the interests of actors and social 
relations. Consequently, when external shocks occur, they verify the 
established institutions, which are refractory and repeatedly self-reinforce. 
Rational choice institutionalism, on the other hand, asserts that institutions 
move toward an equilibrium point by adopting the best strategy under the 
given conditions and circumstances (Ivernsen and Soskice 2006; Greif and 
Laitin 2004). In common with historical institutionalism, rational theorists 
propose the concept of a self-reinforcing equilibrium that makes players 
adopt the same institutional choice unless an external shock appears. Finally, 
according to behavioral institutionalism, actors carry out a cost-benefit 
analysis on alternative institutions, hence shaping their preferences (Fioretos 
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2011). The potential costs and benefits of institutional reformation are 
judged by historical legacies. Behavioral institutionalists see that a present 
institutional choice would be abandoned if the result of a cost-benefit 
analysis is differentiated.  
Rational choice institutionalism, behavioral institutionalism, and 
historical institutionalism have a common difficulty in analyzing Brexit. The 
pitfall lies in the neoinstitutional theory itself. First, the institutionalist 
argument regarding the continuity and path dependency of institutions is 
often divorced from actual choices. This is because institutionalism 
premises that the actors’ interests are predetermined by established 
institutions. Contrary with institutionalists’ expectations, however, actual 
institutional changes often occur in different directions with established 
institutions beyond the interests of actors. For instance, the successfully 
accomplished social pacts of European countries are attributable to a shared 
understanding between actors (Avdagic et al. 2011). In Ireland, what was 
helpful to constitute a corporatist governance system was not institutional 
conditions defined a priori but rather the political exchanges between the 
main actors, a social agreement, and shared understanding and virtues 
(Kwon 2014). 
Neoliberals also present a significant flaw of neoinstitutionalism. 
According to the convergence theory of neoliberalism, every political 
economic model of nation-states converges toward a liberal market model 
featuring flexible production and labor. It signifies a deviation from the 
traditional political economic model. Irrelevant to the validity of the 
neoliberal argument, a few northern European countries lost their Keynesian 
social democratic policy measures by implementing flexible labor policy 
(Grahl and Teague 1997; Lash and Urry 1987; Streeck and Schmitter 1991). 
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The aim of the labor policy was to curb a wage increase and make 
production flexible, finally raising competitiveness in the world economy. 
Although the rule of competition slightly changed after globalization, 
including opening the domestic market and the free movement of capital 
and labor, there were no external shocks that could lead to institutional 
changes in the paradigm-shifting level. Although most institutionalists 
predicate upon the punctuated equilibrium theory, suggesting an institutional 
change because of the influence of external crisis, changes in competition 
conditions and preferences could make strategic actors choose alternative 
institutional options.  
In other words, an institutional choice that is disparate from the 
existing contexts appears more sharply and more frequently than what 
neoinstitutionalists maintain. Another example is the French political 
economic model after the 1990s. During the 1950–60s, France, under the 
guidance of Charles De Gaulle, established state capitalism, where the 
development of the national economy was mainly driven by state planning. 
After the 1990s, however, the French government kept trying to improve the 
flexibility of labor to strengthen the competitiveness of the national industry. 
These attempts are noticeable in the Macron government. As such, the 
French institutions of political economy are going under a gradual reform, 
even without an external crisis, finally deviating from the existing 
institutional contexts. This somewhat negates the neoinstitutionalist premise 
that the interests of actors are constituted a priori and do not change 
routinely. Rather, the interests of actors are often adjusted by the interactions 
between actors and subsequent change of circumstances.  
Brexit is counterevidence of the institutional theory, which sees 
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interests as transcendentally constructed because an institutional change 
occurred, even though the LME system persisted. Specifically, the interests 
and preferences of domestic actors and subsequent behaviors in the UK in 
2016 are not appropriately accounted for only by looking at institutions.  
Second, institutional gains are not estimated by economic efficiency, as 
neoinstitutionalists argue. Following VOC, economic efficiency becomes 
more secure if institutions such as corporate governance structure, business 
relations, and the like are complementary. Likewise, institutional gains and 
economic efficiency are closely intertwined in neoinstitutional theory. In 
empirical terms, however, not all institutional changes aim at adjusting 
economic interests. When we consider an institutional alternative, judging 
the criteria to with which evaluate its validity are not just economic 
rationality or interests but vary from actor to actor. For example, apropos 
reducing social security, we could consider the immediate economic benefits, 
but at the same time, shared social, cultural, and ethical virtues such as 
protecting the disadvantaged, decreasing the wage gap, and improving 
social stability are included as a yardstick. Furthermore, even economic 
interests could be understood as short term and long term. Unlike short-term 
interests like a rise in the stock market, a wage increase, and so forth, long-
term interests are often integrated with communitarian virtues. For instance, 
long-term economic interests such as creating jobs and national economy 
growth have both economic and social aspects. In brief, institutions could be 
calculated not only by their economic gains, but also by the diverse 
perspectives particular to each actor.  
In practice, actors voluntarily integrate disparate institutions because it 
is the actors who decide the meaning and effects of institutionsthem. For 
example, the Blair government sought the reformation of the EU in a way 
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that agreed with the British liberal market economy (Hobolt 2016). He was 
able to blend the European communitarian virtues with neoliberal 
institutions. Meanwhile, the Major government refused to adopt the 
European Social Chapter and observed its opt-out right in the transition 
phase into the EMU. When the Major government interpreted the EU policy 
option, not only an economic cost-benefit analysis, but also the British 
exceptionalism and Euroscepticism, were considered (George 1998; Foster 
2002; Gifford 2016).  
Neoinstitutionalism takes the interests, preferences, and coalitions of 
actors as equivalent because they are defined in economic terms. In fact, real 
actors include not only the economic variables, but also other variables 
when considering their interests, preferences, and coalitions. As a result, 
three concepts have different values. Accordingly, there must be a gap 
between the reality and an attempt to observe the institutional changes on 
economic factors. 
Brexit supports the argument that neoinstitutional studies overstate the 
economic factors when it comes to institutional changes. Even though the 
UK should have chosen to stay in the EU if the decision was grounded on an 
economic cost-benefit analysis, the choice was not solely based on an 
economic analysis. For these reasons, we could refute the premise that the 
interests of actors are interpreted by economic factors alone. Consequently, 
many studies endeavor to define the interests of the British actors by 
looking at diverse facets: maladaptation of the British two-party system in 
the era of globalization, substantive weakness of the Conservative and the 
Labour Parties (Ford and Goodwin 2017; Jessop 2017; Morgan 2017), 
growing support for the far-right populist parties because of an increasing 
number of immigrants and terrorism (Hobolt 2016; Balibar 2016), and so on.  
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Third, because neoinstitutionalism does not take into account the 
internal process of politics, institutional changes without external shocks are 
not the objects of consideration. To understand institutional changes, recent 
historical institutionalists have suggested an updated argument: the 
respective actors can interpret institutions disparately because of the 
ambiguity embedded in institutions. In addition, because legislators and the 
followers of institutions are different, the actual operation of institutions can 
vary. Here, rational choice institutionalists assert the possibility of gradual 
institutional changes through everyday politics. The actual actors produce 
feedback as practicing institutions, and they strategically consider feedback 
from other actors, which becomes a source of gradual institutional changes 
(Pierson 2004; Greif and Leitin 2004).  
Yet the institutional theory still returns to the problem first pointed out: 
a direction of political change is confined to established institutions even in 
recent self-corrected theoretical perspectives. For instance, many 
conventional descriptions end up relating interpretation of interests, 
preferences, and alternative institutions into existing institutions; even when 
adapting institutions to changed socioeconomic environments, actors 
voluntarily interpret institutions, consider feedback from each other to reach 
an equilibrium, and weigh alternative institutions following self-corrected 
historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and behavioral 
institutionalism. In other words, because the recent development of 
neoinstitutionalism embraced an individual interpretation of actors as a 
significant variable, it earned more leeway to reflect actual institutional 
changes. At the same time , the modified perspectives still constrain an 
interpretation of these actors by the established institutions as retrenching 
room for arbitrary of interpreting interests and institutions.  
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For these reasons, the endogenous dynamics born by the actual 
interactions among actors and institutional changes cannot be adequately 
described by neoinstitutionalism. The Brexit Issue also requires explanatory 
variables other than existing institutions for understanding it. Hence, the 
current thesis concentrates on interactions and ideas as the pervasive 
impetus of Brexit. Here, the actors who weighed Brexit as an institutional 
alternative laid more stress on the Brexit Idea than the LME system, which 
was accompanied by an understanding that leaving the EU would be 
appropriate. 
The last problem of conventional neoinstitutional is that it overlooks 
the variables of international politics, omitting international political 
variables from the very beginning of the analysis or regarding international 
variables only as an intermediate or control variable. For example, 
Gourevitch (1986) takes into account the international system when 
studying domestic policy making. Indeed, his analysis centered on the 
production profile, a dependent variable about economic interests. The 
international system was inconsistently considered only when unexplained 
by the production profile.  
In effect, after the 1990s, pressures from international relations tended 
to directly engage in domestic institutional changes. The Brexit case 
encountered relational pressures from an international level because it 
concerned a supranational regime with its member states. Specifically, after 
the 2015 European Migrant Crisis, the UK was given pressure to accept 
more immigrants and pay more contributions to EU member states like 
France, Germany, and the Southern European countries (Trauner 2016). 
Likewise, when the Wilson government held the referendum on joining the 
EEC and renegotiating the joining conditions, increasing the UK’s 
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contributions to the EEC were brought into question (Brivati and Young 
1993; Duncan and Pilkington 2005). Therefore, it is necessary to weigh 
international variables to understand Brexit, which encompasses both 
domestic and international politics. 
 
2.3. International Political Theory 
 
The international political theory focuses on how structural pressures 
from international politics and the global market decide national politics. 
Perspectives on the international political theory diverge based on the 
degree of structural pressures, interconnectedness between nation-states, 
capacity of nonstate actors, and so forth. Yet they all argue on that 
international political pressures directly determine domestic politics such as 
the type of regime and coalition, institutional environments, and the like.  
A key example is the late industrialization debates (Gershcenkron 
1963; Landes 1969; Hobsawm 1969; Kurth 1979b). A comparative study on 
late industrialization argues that political outcomes are decided by the 
international economy and when each country initiated its industrialization. 
In general, few competitors and industrial structures are unsophisticated and 
occur during the early stage of development. In contrast, competition 
between players becomes fierce, and industry becomes complicated in the 
late stage of industrialization where there are more thorough conditions for 
late developers (Gerschenkron 1963). The more advanced the international 
economy becomes, the more the entry cost for new entrants increases. For 
instance, the UK initiated its industrialization during the Industrial 
Revolution in the eighteenth century, and that economic development was 
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relatively linear and simple. The steep industrial development at that time 
was because of the accordance between the British liberalism and simple 
character of industrialization. 
Kurth (1979b), who developed the argument of Gerschenkron, shows 
how the global economy determines national politics. According to Kurth, 
premodern and modern classes coexisted in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Latin 
American countries, which were late developers. Not surprisingly, the 
liberal and authoritarian regimes alternatively occurred among the dominant 
class. It is a feature of international economic development, especially in an 
industry that is seized and abandoned by early developers that decide the 
form of the emerging regime at specific points in time. Despite the strength 
of late industrialization debates in revealing the leverage of the international 
economy, they are still ineffective in describing international and domestic 
interactions, especially in understanding national politics and economy. In 
other words, late industrialization debates end up returning to the 
aforementioned problem of domestic political economic studies in that it is a 
domestic political system that eventually decides the specific aspects of 
realizing international influence.  
The dependencia theory stresses the dominant effect of international 
factors over domestic political ones. This theory is aimed at eschewing 
reductionism toward domestic politics and its variables (Frank 1969; 
Wallerstein 1974). According to the dependencia theory, advanced 
capitalism sets the framework for an international economy that restricts 
what lesser developed countries can adopt. Because the international system 
is constructed by core countries that monopolize international political 
resources such as capital and military preponderance, the resources taken by 
lesser developed countries are scarce. Because of a scarcity of resources, the 
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benefits for various sectors from global economic growth are unequal. As a 
consequence, modern sectors meeting the needs of the global economy keep 
growing, but other sectors stay in doldrums.  
A comparative study of Wallerstein (1974) suggests that the 
international political system is divided into core, semiperiphery, and 
periphery groups, and each country group faces indigenous demands from 
international politics. Acceding to demands, core countries develop strong 
states, periphery countries develop weak states, and semiperiphery countries 
develop hybrids. However, the dependencia theory cannot fully understand 
the differentiation among countries in the same group. Why respective 
periphery countries do not have identical state capabilities is not explained. 
Notwithstanding an initial awareness of a problem that reductionism toward 
national politics should be rejected, the dependencia theory retreats to 
domestic politics again to portray political outcomes.  
Compared with late industrialization debates and the dependencia 
theory, which emphasizes pressures from the international political 
economic system, there also is a school of thought considers the influence of 
globalization and interstate relations as being far more dominant: the 
liberalism and interdependence schools. Liberalists maintain that both 
investor and recipient countries experience economic growth and increasing 
wealth by coming into close relations with each other under world market 
forces. According to the liberal argument, all nation-states go through an 
analogous way of economic growth and development.  
The interdependence school primarily casts doubt on whether a state is 
a single performer of an international system because governmental 
behaviors are more immediately restricted by international relations when 
there is increasing interdependence among nation-states (Nye and Keohane 
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1971; Morse 1976). Following the emergence of supranational and 
multinational performers and the loss of governmental control measures, 
power is transferred from the central government to other actors until the 
national political structure transforms. Yet the arguments of liberalists and 
interdependence schools can only be applied to a limited number of cases 
and do not have consistent and general explanatory power. Compared with 
conventional studies such as late industrialization debates or the 
dependencia theory, these schools of thought are less effective in delineating 
the influence of international politics over domestic ones, which could be 
considered one of its most serious defects.  
In sum, the international political theory overemphasizes international 
political variables and thus cannot explain why national politics 
differentiate; it often lacks a measure to describe causal relationships 
between international and domestic variables. Although the international 
political theory and a political economic analysis such as historicism or 
institutionalism respectively argue the opposite, both regard international 
and domestic politics as a divided territory and stress the absolute 
ascendency of specific variables. Consequently, they cannot investigate the 
interactions between international and domestic politics.  
Because Brexit assumes interactions between international and 
domestic politics, there is a limit to the explanation of the international 
political theory. Brexit was put under internal pressures from the 
international community, as well as the British national political mechanism. 
In addition, understanding the politics of each nation-state must take 
precedence to examine the distinct feature of Brexit when compared with 
France or Germany. Therefore, we must modify and reorganize conventional 
comparative studies. The current thesis builds a theoretical framework based 
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on an existing political economic analysis and international political theory, 
emphasizing the discursive interactions between international and domestic 
politics and on the causal relations among variables.  
 
2.4. Research Hypothesis and Theoretical Framework 
 
2.4.1. Research Hypothesis 
 
The current thesis puts forward three key hypotheses about the reasons 
why the UK chose to leave the EU, features of the Brexit Idea, and the 
relationship between institutions and ideas. 
 
Research Hypothesis 1: The “Brexit Idea,” whose principal pillars 
are deglobalization, Euroscepticism, and neonationalism, served as an 
impetus to leave the EU. The idea was formulated by discursive 
interactions between international and domestic political actors. 
 
Many ideas, including deglobalization, Euroscepticism, and 
neonationalism, were formulated into the Brexit Idea by the discursive 
interactions that occurred in the EU and its member states. The Brexit Idea 
became an impetus for British voters to choose to leave the EU. This 
argument is different from what considers the British economy as a divided 
container and proposes domestic political factors as the sole independent 
variable. At the same time, it is contrasted with the argument that Brexit was 
decided only by the political and economic pressures the EU put on it. 
According to the current thesis, the Brexit Idea was constructed at the 
international political level and restructured the interests and preferences of 
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domestic actors, finally leading to a reform of domestic institutions. Brexit 
is considered an institutional reform triggered by the alteration of a shared 
understanding that moved toward the Brexit Idea. 
 
Research Hypothesis 2: The Brexit Idea has ambivalent characters. 
Although its understanding is open to discussion and repeated 
reinterpretation, it is pervasive and firmly exists as an ideational axis of 
social cleavages. Both solidity and fragility are features of the Brexit Idea.  
 
Although the Brexit Idea is firmly entrenched in European societies, its 
contents are still open to individual interpretation. In other words, the 
initiation of the Brexit debate was almost inevitable because the existence of 
Brexit Idea was secured, and even the Idea pervaded to the extent that a new 
social cleavage rose. At the same time, however, the social actors of the 
European countries did not consent to its meaning and way of interpretation, 
leaving each actor room to understand it. Thus, the Brexit Idea is internally 
fragile despite its external stability, showing its ambivalence. In theoretical 
terms, although many studies perceive ideas as a significant variable, they 
overlook the feature of ideas. Indeed, the possibility or concrete direction of 
institutional reform by ideas depends a lot on ideas.  
 
Research Hypothesis 3: Ideas can lead actors to transform 
institutions by modifying their understanding of preferences, interests, and 
institutions at both the international and domestic levels. This implies that 
ideas play a significant role in changing institutions in an open economy. 
In addition, ideas can reinforce the distinctiveness of the established 
model of each national economy.  
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Each member state, including the UK, Germany, and France, adopted a 
disparate European policy even though they shared some thoughts in 
common. In particular, the direction of institutional change was toward 
reinforcing the uniqueness of the established economic model of each 
country rather than weakening it. It is true that ideas at the international 
level are shared by all countries that participate in the related discourse. Yet 
ideas do not necessarily lead each society to foster the same kind of 
institutions. Instead, varied institutional changes come about through the 
features of related ideas and by the specific processes of mobilization. The 
current thesis opposes the argument that national economic models converge 
into a liberal market economy or that the uniqueness of each model is 
weakened because of increasing international discourses. 
 
2.4.2. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change and Ideational 
Approach 
 
The present thesis proposes an analytic framework with three key 
aspects. First, to examine the decision of the UK to leave, the current thesis 
adopts the endogenous institutional change theory and ideational approach. 
The endogenous institutional change theory is distinguished from the path-
dependency argument and punctuated equilibrium theory: it is neither about 
the classic historical institutional approach stating that the LME system led 
to Brexit, nor about that external shocks such as global economic crisis or 
refugee crisis that led to Brexit. Instead, the British voters interacted at the 
international and domestic politics and enthusiastically modified the 
understanding on their preferences, interests, or institutions, finally arriving 
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at Brexit. In addition, the current thesis maintains that the interactions 
between actors can be captured by means of ideas based on an ideational 
approach.  
Second, the current thesis studies the concept of idea, including its 
formulation and mobilization, external and internal features, and 
relationships with institutional reform. Our review of Brexit confirms that 
when the EU counteracted against socioeconomic challenges, the Brexit 
Idea became firmly shaped. The interactions and discourses that occurred 
during the counteracting process are ascribable to Brexit. This argument is 
distinct from conventional international relations studies stating that 
interactions at international politics produce consistent and fixed forms of 
international systems. It is an idea with the feature of the floating resources 
that are created by increasing interactions among nation-states in the era of 
globalization. Ideas are deemed to be floating because they are open to the 
arbitrary and voluntary reinterpretation of social actors. In the current thesis, 
this floating character will be described as the internal fragility of ideas. On 
the other hand, some ideas have greater influence in public discourses. 
Those ideas strongly lead actors to initiate a discourse on related themes, 
even creating a social cleavage. This aspect of ideas is told as externally 
stable and secure. According to the current thesis, the Brexit Idea is open to 
the reinterpretation of individual actors while inevitably producing related 
conflicts and discourses.  
Third, the current thesis investigates how the Brexit Idea was utilized 
to mobilize voters toward the leave side. The mobilization of ideas will be 
divided into two stages: creating a few discourses of British society by 
integrating the Brexit Idea and LME system and modifying the preferences 
and interests of actors through discursive interactions using the Brexit Idea. 
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By distinguishing the mobilization of ideas into two stages, the present 
thesis suggests the de facto influence of ideas as an independent variable in 
isolation from the influence of institutions.  
First, the current thesis is based on the endogenous institutional change 
theory and ideational approach, focusing on the aspect of ideas and 
highlighting the dynamics of discursive interactions, as well as the 
connectedness of international and national politics. Although the current 
thesis agrees with the fundamental premises of the endogenous institutional 
change theory and the ideational approach, it introduces a modification to 
the understanding of ideas. 
According to endogenous institutional change theory, social actors 
interpret their interests during political and discursive interactions (Kwon 
2014). Then, they construct a political coalition and derive political 
outcomes in favor of their interests (Gourevitch 1978, 1986; Kahler and 
Lake 2013). Social actors construct ideas through social interactions, and 
ideas become a framework for interpreting the interests of actors. In this 
way, ideas are directly involved in developing institutions. Once again, 
institutions as an outcome of ideational interactions impact the construction 
of ideas by reorganizing the surrounding environments of actors. 
Consequently, social actors, discursive interactions, policy and institutions, 
and ideas are closely intertwined inside the cyclic process of political 
outcomes.  
It is not the existing institutions or external shocks that determine 
whether institutions will be changed or where they will be directed. Rather, 
the cognitive behaviors of actors determine the possibility or specific 
direction of institutional changes. Actors actively strive to understand a 
problematic situation and to have normative judgment on various social 
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virtues, including economic interests. Therefore, this type of analysis is 
distinguished from the path dependency argument or punctuated equilibrium 
theory. In addition, when compared with self-corrected neoinstitutional 
arguments, an endogenous perspective is more flexible in recognizing the 
larger room for individual and voluntary reinterpretation of institutions. 
Recent neoinstitutionalists, on the other hand, see that existing institutions 
constrain the interpretation of actors but still acknowledge the possibility for 
actors to individually interpret institutions (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; 
Pierson 2004). 
Another reason that the endogenous theory is well suited to investigate 
Brexit is that Brexit displays continuity and discontinuity at the same time. 
Although the political economic environments of the UK, such as anti-
European sentiment, Euroscepticism, LME, and the absence of external 
shocks, have continued for most of the postwar period, institutional rupture 
in the field of foreign policy was realized. If British foreign policy divorced 
from the existing institutional path, this phenomenon should be analyzed in 
terms of a change in understanding and interpretation by the actors rather 
than a problematic situation or the institutional environments themselves 
(Schmidt 2008; Blyth 2002). Not surprisingly, in this respect, ideas are 
emphasized once again as “cognitive filters that principal actors take 
advantage of to interpret surrounding institutional environments and 
encountering problem and to grasp their own preferenc es” (Kwon 2014). 
Yet the current thesis has two different ways of constructing idea 
concepts: the endogenous theory and the ideational approach (Schmidt 1996, 
2008; Blyth 2002). First, the current thesis agrees with the argument of the 
endogenous perspective that ideas are modified not only in the case of crisis 
but in everyday politics. Compared with the endogenous perspective, the 
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present thesis insists that changes in ideas accumulated through everyday 
political moments are more powerful explanatory variables for political 
outcomes than rapid ideational changes in crisis. Considering that ideas are 
formulated and interpreted by discursive interactions with gradual and 
cumulative features, practice in daily politics could be more appropriate to 
understand most political outcomes rather than an exceptional and 
unprecedented crisis.  
When we assume that socioeconomic challenges happened to the 
European countries and that the interactions among member states and 
domestic coalitions led to the UK leaving the EU, Brexit is not radical and 
dissociative but rather gradual and cumulative. Subsequently, an ideational 
variable is persuasive in intermediating a series of events the EU 
encountered and in leading to Brexit as a result of these events. Yet it is 
nearly irrefutable that ideas emerging unexpectedly in the case of sudden 
crises are more striking and evident than cumulative changes of ideas in 
daily politics. Thus, the present thesis criticizes the problem that the 
importance of constructing ideas during everyday politics in understanding 
substantial political outcomes is excessively overlooked in most 
comparative studies.  
Second, ideas can be formulated at the international level and 
transferred to domestic politics as well. In the era of globalization, this 
feature of ideas is significantly influential in tracing institutional changes. 
Ideas are neither a peculiar product of national politics nor an ascribed and 
fixed variable. Similar to national politics, shared understandings of the 
given theme are formed and altered through enthusiastic discursive 
interactions among member states at the EU level. Then, these ideas must 
have been born from international politics, such as the Brexit Idea, and work 
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as a framework for domestic actors to choose their specific behaviors. Of 
course, there is the transmission of ideas from national politics to the 
international system. Because the current thesis departs from the existing 
literature that overlooks international factors, it focuses on formulating ideas 
at the international level. Therefore, ideas may not only be formed by 
international behaviors, but also can become a key variable bridging 
international systems and domestic politics. 
 
2.4.3. Formulation and Mobilization of Ideas 
 
The present thesis suggests that when a problematic situation occurs in 
everyday politics, individual states and regional communities interact and 
create related discourses to solve the problem. As a consequence of these 
discourses, the participating countries produce a shared idea. This analytic 
frame is contrasted against a conventional study that regards the outputs of 
international relations as an international system that has a linear and fixed 
nature. For example, late industrialization debates argue that international 
market forces, a kind of international relationship, build a linear hierarchy 
composed of early developer and late developer countries (Gerschenkron 
1963). Then, the international economic hierarchy forces each country to 
develop a specific regime form.  
Yet this perspective makes an unexplainable divergence of regimes 
within the same country group, as Gourevitch (1978) has criticized. Hence, 
most limitations of the existing comparative study result from seeing it as a 
linear and stationary system that international relationships produce. This is 
because the preceding studies largely ignored both dynamic interactions in 
international relations and the active behaviors of actors for interpretation. 
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The current thesis proposes that international relationships effectuate 
the interactions between players and that these discursive interactions beget 
related ideas. In detail, the community of nation-states and individual 
nation-state encounter socioeconomic challenges. These challenges include 
every situation that happens during everyday policy making rather than just 
a large-scale crisis such as the Great Depression. Every nation-state and 
their community recognize problematic situations and cope with them at 
both the national and community levels. When solving problems, issue-
specific or pan-issue discourses are bound to arise. Compared with a 
perspective that deals with only national politics to examine a significant 
discourse or that international and national discourses are clearly divided 
(Waltz 1979), the current thesis assumes there are discursive interactions 
during everyday politics and that ideational variables cross the international 
and domestic levels.  
Furthermore, ideas as the shared understanding of actors are generated 
by a problematic situation, repetitive actions against the situation, and 
repeated reproduction of discourses. To cope with problems in a cooperative 
and consistent way, countries develop a common understanding of an 
awareness of problems and responses. When it comes to having a common 
understanding, the current thesis claims it is realized in the form of an idea. 
In addition, the ideas suggested here are privately owned resources. Ideas 
cannot be disposed of by particular hierarchal groups such as an early 
industrialized country, country with security ascendency or so forth, as the 
above-mentioned studies on international relations alleged. Rather, ideas are 
floating resources that every country and individual actor can freely exploit. 
Actors voluntarily interpret and transform ideas through interactive 
discourses and switch transformed ideas into their exclusive resources.  
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In the case of Brexit, the EU began to face socioeconomic challenges 
that were especially caused by globalization. The European Debt Crisis and 
European Migrant Crisis in 2015 display that the EU and member states had 
shown both cooperative and domestic policy against the challenge of 
globalization. Against expectations, problems were not resolved, and only 
recognition of the inequality among member states was proliferated, if 
anything. For example, the EU implemented its major decision making at 
the European Parliament (EP) to achieve de facto equality in decision 
making among member states. Compared with its initial goal, countries that 
took the lead were so-called core countries such as Germany and France. 
When the European Debt Crisis fell over Europe, the EU policy imposed on 
the Southern European countries was determined by the European 
Commission, European Bank (EB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
meaning a few advanced capitalisms took responsibility rather than just the 
EP.  
Going through a series of events after the 2000s, the EU member states 
came to share an understanding of the failure of the EU to achieve 
democratic ideals and infringement on the meridional countries’ sovereignty. 
As a consequence of a damaged dream at the EU level, the European actors 
cast doubt on a few goals that the EU pursued from the beginning: liberal 
trade, substantial regional integration, and deepening globalization. For 
instance, because the EU claimed to support globalization through phased 
integration, pervasive recognition of inequality at the EU had grown into a 
deglobalization idea. The European actors arrived at a decision to refute 
attempts for phased and partial globalization, whose incarnation was the EU. 
In other words, the value judgment deeming deglobalization as “adequate” 
or “right” came to be shared by the member states through the discourses of 
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international politics.  
In this way, neonationalism, Euroscepticism, deglobalization, and 
related ideas finally integrated into the Brexit Idea, which became an 
influential trigger for the leave side, suggesting how the Brexit Idea first 
formulated. After its crystallization at the macro political level, the ideas 
experienced a differentiating stage in each society by the main actors and 
their groups. How the Brexit Idea was formulated will be delineated in 
chapter 4.  
When it comes to the mobilization of ideas, the current thesis asserts 
that interpreting and mobilizing ideas must happen in domestic politics. It is 
true that path dependent institutions define the economic and social position 
of actors and constrain their interests, at least to some degree. Yet a more 
decisive factor when it comes to being aware of a problem, interpreting 
interests, and framing policy is the actual process of political and discursive 
interactions. When given a problematic situation, each actor introduces it 
into their cognition, constitutes feasible alternatives, and decides to adopt a 
new institution. What is important in this process is that actors have their 
own paradigm and that the power struggle among the actors comes to adjust 
the paradigm of the whole society (Hay 2006). Therefore, the interests of 
actors are socially constructed by domestic politics. 
When we regard the ideas of international discourses as the basis for 
political struggle among domestic actors, we must analyze the domestic 
process of interpreting and mobilizing ideas. Following the way actors 
introduce ideas and construct their own understanding of situations, interests, 
and feasible alternatives, domestic political factors change, such as the 
behaviors of actors, alignments of social coalitions, and policy.  
To closely examine the mobilizing process, the process of introducing 
 
 ４４ 
ideas is divided into two stages. First, ideas from international politics are 
adapted to or integrated with the political system and institutional 
environments of each national economy. This is why ideas shared by nation-
states are converted into discourses that assume the peculiar direction of 
society. Who transforms international ideas into domestic discourses and 
ideas are the principal domestic actors, such as state, industry, labor, and 
capital. Principal actors tend to process international ideas into a compatible 
form with existing domestic institutions, at least to a certain extent.  
In the UK, conservative forces played a significant role in the 
integrating of the Brexit Idea, especially the deglobalization part, and the 
traditional LME system in securing electorate support and to sew together 
the ragged party because of internal conflicts. The result was proleave 
discourses; the proleave discourses mainly consisted of recovering 
sovereignty and economic competitiveness by withdrawing from the EU. 
Meanwhile, introducing international ideas into domestic society does not 
necessarily mean moving toward discourses compatible with existing 
institutions. For instance, withdrawal from the European common market is 
contradictory to free trade and the free market principle of the LME system. 
Even if newly introduced discourses are disparate from existing institutions, 
they also could be a dominant political discourse. However, this is true only 
if they correspond to the recognition of actors at any given point of time and 
if they offset the costs of leaving from the existing institutional path.  
Second, once international ideas are introduced into domestic society, 
they spread across society by mobilizing individual actors. It is not until the 
second stage of mobilization that the various paradigms of individual actors 
come to the front in the form of a slogan, bill, policy, and so forth. Then, 
diverse paradigms in society compete through power struggles among actors 
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and coalitions. The paradigm declaring its predominance is directly reflected 
in the institution-changing process. Although the Conservative and the far-
right forces such as the UK Independence Party evidently constituted the 
leave side discourses, the Labour Party or the City failed to articulate the 
opposite discourse. Failure to constitute and proliferate their own paradigm 
may be seen as the most plausible cause of losing electorate support, as 
shown in the 2016 referendum. Along the same line of thought, Brexit can 
be dubbed as a slight victory of the paradigm held by the Conservative Party 
and far rights. 
 
2.4.4. Institutionalization of Ideas by Solidity and Fragility 
 
In an era of globalization, ideas can be formulated by discursive 
interactions among actors at the international political level and then 
transferred to domestic society. Social actors individually interpret the 
adopted ideas in accordance with existing institutions. Individual actors who 
have their own understanding of ideas struggle to gain political power, 
which is usually represented as electorate supports. This analytic framework 
of the idea-centered process was mentioned in the previous chapter with an 
emphasis on dynamic interactions and politics.  
There is another significant condition regarding whether ideas will be 
converted into institutions and established as a part of the national economic 
model. The current thesis suggests what eventually determines a possibility 
or a direction of institutional changes is the feature of ideas. When it comes 
to the institutionalization of ideas, much depends on the nature of ideas 
beyond the formation and mobilization of ideas.  
Although there are innumerable ways to grasp the feature of ideas, the 
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present thesis concentrates on the fragility of ideas and distinguishes 
fragility into external and internal facets. The importance of the fragility of 
ideas is attributable to the relationship between the ideational fragility and 
the institutional changes. Ideational changes and struggles among individual 
ideas play a crucial role in deriving gradual and cumulative changes in 
everyday politics, which make up a substantial portion of the institutional 
environments of a national economy. Consequently, the fragility of ideas 
puts a different hue on discursive interactions and decides an occurrence 
direction of institutional changes. Not surprisingly, a feature of ideas should 
be understood in relation to the discursive interactions of which ideas 
become a foundation.  
First, the internal fragility of ideas implicates there is no canonical 
understanding on ideas; thus, individual actors could voluntarily reinterpret 
ideas for their own sake. If ideas are in a fragile state, this means there can 
be further interpretation and understanding by willing actors. Considering 
that ideas are a framework for actors to understand their interests, 
preferences, institutional alternatives, and so on, ideas being internally 
fragile insinuate that social actors could have different types of knowledge 
about a problematic situation. With the diverse appreciation of the 
problematic situation, actors have differentiated the organization of interests 
and preferences and thus display disparate support for feasible political 
outcomes. In other words, with the internal fragility of ideas, actors could 
find their own meanings in ideas compared with what others find and utilize 
this in discursive interactions for policy outcomes. In the opposite case, if 
ideas are internally solid, a perception of the ideas is given and is consistent 
without controversy.  
Second, ideas could be externally fragile if they cannot drive actors to 
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initiate debates on related themes. The reason for being externally fragile is 
because ideas are still a trivial issue at any given point of time. In contrast, if 
ideas are externally solid and secured, starting debates on the idea becomes 
inevitable. Externally solid ideas could even create a social cleavage by 
being an ideational axis (Stein and Rokkan 1999). Regardless of the 
substantive contents of ideas and related interactions, ideas with external 
solidity force social actors to either form a coalition or confront each other 
along the ideational axis.  
In brief, the current thesis analyzes a feature of ideas according to their 
fragility/solidity in both their external and internal aspects. Although the 
external solidity of ideas indicates the force of ideas in forming and 
establishing related discourses in a society, internal fragility means there is a 
large amount of space for the voluntary and arbitrary reinterpretation of 
ideas. In other words, external and internal fragility are respectively related 
to the inevitability of existence and the substantive meaning of ideas. 
Although these features are closely intertwined and affect institutional 
changes in complicated ways, they could be recognized as independent from 
each other.  
Based on the external and internal fragility of ideas, the current thesis 
proposes a relationship between institutional changes and the nature of ideas. 
Through a feature of ideas, we could find if institutional changes will occur 
and whether the direction of the institutional changes can be expected. First, 
looking at the case that ideas are externally solid and internally fragile, it is 
likely that the discourses related to the ideas will occur and that domestic 
coalitions will be realigned following the discourse. Thus, the possibility of 
institutional changes increases because public deliberation through 
discursive interactions takes place. On the other hand, because the contents 
 
 ４８ 
of ideas are not given and room for interpreting them remains, it is hard to 
suggest a direction for the institutional changes. Irrelevant to the high 
probability that idea-related discourses occur in society, we must follow one 
path of institutional transition because of the semantic uncertainty of ideas. 
The Brexit Idea falls into this category, as will be discussed later.  
Second, in cases where ideas are solid in both their external and 
internal facets, it is evident that institutional changes will occur in the 
expected direction. Because the knowledge of the ideas is already agreed 
upon by most social actors or given by powerful actors or coalitions and 
thus has internal solidity, institutional changes driven by ideas could be 
predicted. When compared with internally fragile ideas, ideas with internal 
solidity are prone to lead to more or less predictable institutional reforms, 
whether the changes are continuous or interrupted using the existing 
institutional path. 
Finally, we cannot discuss the direction of institutional changes if the 
fundamental ideas are externally fragile. Actors have little interest in 
specific ideas considered externally fragile. Social actors and coalitions 
show an air of indifference toward institutional changes being brought about 
by an externally fragile idea. Hence, there is a slim chance that institutional 
change will occur. Not surprisingly, the course of change cannot be 
discussed regarding externally fragile ideas.  
We have examined the character of ideas by looking at fragility/solidity 
and their relationship to institutional changes. As mentioned above, there is 
a necessity to return to a historical institutional perspective. The historical 
view is required to examine an idea and its features. Because the fragility of 
ideas and its relationship with institutions could be defined only in relative 
terms, historical contexts should not be ignored. That is, an explanation 
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using the ideational variables demands the timely compensation of a 
comparative historical analysis. This is why the present thesis adopts both 
an ideational approach and the endogenous institutional change theory. Our 


























Chapter 3. History of the UK–EU Relationship: 
Patterns of Stop-Go 
 
In the reconstruction era following World War II, attempts to integrate 
the broken continent were attempted. Following the suggestion of Robert 
Schuman, the Foreign Minister of France, the European countries led by 
France and West Germany established the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1952. It was the first step toward restoring peace in 
the European continent. The efforts to establish the new international system 
deepened in the 1957 Treaty of Rome that founded the EEC. Integrated into 
the EEC, the European countries started to build an economy that rivaled the 
U.S. economy. These supranational efforts to spawn peace came from an 
awareness that the pursuit of exclusive national interests caused the tragedy. 
As a consequence, the European countries decided to adopt an international 
system based less on nation-states and more on the commonwealth of 
independent countries.  
The UK assumed a different stance than other European countries 
when it came to European integration. As a victorious country, the UK self-
praised itself for getting back peace by attracting the U.S. to take part in the 
war and by bringing the war to an end. It was partly why the UK regarded 
itself as a leader of world and rejected being a mere European country. In 
addition, to sign up for supranational entities like the EEC implied a partial 
transfer of national sovereignty from individual nation-state to a coalition of 
countries. From the British perspective, transferring its glorious sovereignty 
to a gathering of modest countries that could not be balanced out. Thus, the 
UK refused to join the ECSC and engaged in European integration debates 
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based on its national interests. In other words, the UK was neither affected 
by Europe Program of the United States of Europe program nor criticism on 
the nation-state-centric view of the early twentieth century.  
It is ironic, however, that the person who first advocated for the 
concept of the United States of Europe was Winston Churchill in 1946. At 
the very first stage of European integration, it was principally British 
politicians such as Churchill who steered the integration program. Moreover, 
the UK endeavored to construct an economic bloc with the Nordic countries 
that would be equivalent to the EEC. As shown in these examples, British 
foreign policy was not merely anti-Europe and prioritized its national 
identity to a European identity. Rather, it fluctuated, and this fluctuating 
trend lasted until the referendum of 2016. The UK decided to leave the EU 
once again, and its politics after the referendum went as far as to be mocked 
by other European countries as being whimsical. Why did the UK decide to 
sign up the Maastricht Treaty in the 1990s and to withdraw from the EU in 
2016? What is a difference between that time and now? How can we 
understand the irregular attitude of the UK toward European integration and 
its wonky foreign policy? 
In this chapter, this thesis will closely review the relationship between 
the UK and the EU historically. By historically reviewing how the UK and 
the EU kept their shaky cooperation, the volatility of British foreign policy 
can be understood. First, British foreign policy was not just chaos, as the 
dominant comparative study portrays, but has a stop-go pattern. British 
foreign policy cannot be attributed to aversions of the UK toward the 
European continent, which occasionally forced the UK to behave 
capriciously. Second, the current thesis suggests that the historical and 
institutional path of foreign policy has had a significant impact on Brexit. 
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Because the principal theme has been understanding Brexit’s historical 
institutional perspective and ideational approach, it is necessary to 
investigate the historical path of the European policy that became the 
institutional background of Brexit. 
 
3.1. Beginning of the Long-term Hostility 
 
3.1.1. Reluctantly Joining the EC (1957–1973) 
 
It is irrefutable that the UK, the self-confessed hegemon, wanted to 
take a lead in stabilizing the European continent shortly after World War II. 
A more important point was that the UK concurrently sought two goals that 
seemed incompatible. The UK desired to maintain its position as a major 
superpower but not to sacrifice national economic interests by getting 
involved in supranational integration. Therefore, the UK refused to 
participate in any supranational organizations, denying the transfer of 
sovereignty. Instead, the UK pursued intergovernmental cooperation to 
restore peace in Western Europe. Representative examples of 
intergovernmental cooperation were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and Organization of European Economic Cooperation. For these reasons, 
the UK did not sign the Treaty of Rome that inaugurated the EEC.  
To put this series of events in more concrete terms, during the Messina 
Conference of June 1955, the foreign ministers of six member states of the 
ECSC—France, West Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg—met to review the achievements of the ECSC and to expand 
its integration into industries other than coal. Accordingly, they launched the 
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Spaak Committee to examine a detailed direction of European integration. 
What these six member states and the Spaak Committee pursued was 
European integration in the form of a common market.  
It is not until this conference that the first stop phase of the UK came to 
light. During the Messina Conference and the Spaak Committee, the UK 
was invited to engage in the activities of the Spaak Committee and further 
common market. Facing the invitation from the European continent, the UK 
revealed a lukewarm stance. Even though the Treasury bureaucrats jibbed at 
not attending a common market, the cabinet only sent a representative 
without the ability to give a final say and did not deliberate on the issue. The 
announced reason was that losing discretion in tariffs would not fit with the 
UK’s hegemon position. In particular, the stop decision was for fear that 
London as a financial center would lose its status because of seceding 
control to the supranational entity. In the first stop phase, it was principally 
its political status in the international system that the UK considered the 
most. 
After the decision to not participate in the EEC, the UK had to find out 
how to counteract the EEC and to retain its economic competitiveness in the 
global market. Harold Macmillan, the former prime minister, proposed the 
EFTA with six states and other European countries. He thought that the 
EFTA could offset the costs of rejecting the EEC. For instance, the UK was 
in a situation where there would be no tariff benefits because of not joining 
the EEC. Unfortunately, the EFTA program floundered as a result of 
opposition from France in 1958. Although the UK tried to take the lead in 
forming intergovernmental cooperation in its favor to balance the costs of its 
first stop decision, other European countries did not align with the UK. To 
make matters worse, the United States was dissatisfied with the EFTA for 
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threatening American supremacy in the international economy. The first 
decision of the UK eventually came to nothing.  
Despite the failure of EFTA, the UK continued to show a go attitude 
regarding European integration. Not only was the sentiment of the UK 
toward Europe not growing to the extent of hostility, but there was also 
urgency. The fragmented European market might exert a negative influence 
on the British economy, and other member states of EFTA could be attracted 
to the EEC. Furthermore, it was plausible that the economic loss of the UK 
might undermine its political clout over Europe, other non-European 
countries, and the whole world. Although the political leverage of the EEC 
was mounting in accordance with its economic growth, it became clear that 
the UK was losing its past glory. These arguments were also assisted by the 
report of the Economic Steering Committee in May 1960. Hence, there was 
no other choice but for the UK to join the EEC to resolve this political and 
economic stalemate.  
Macmillan concluded that the UK should sign up for the EEC to enjoy 
the benefits of the European common market. What is worth noting about 
Macmillan’s decision is the extent to which the UK was willing to 
countenance about European integration. In contrast with the argument of 
the federalists of France and West Germany, Macmillan clarified that the 
UK would approve of a confederation of Europe, not a federation. Here, we 
can find reluctance against European integration. Even when the UK held a 
go stance, it showed the possibility of a stop phase, insinuating the stop–go 
cycle of the British foreign policy.  
After all, Macmillan publicly announced a strong desire to sign up for 
the EEC in 1961. The first try of the UK to do this did not come to anything, 
however. The UK developed its position against the European continent for 
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a decade in the postwar period and vice versa. Charles De Gaulle cast doubt 
on whether the UK was authentic or not. He bore the possibility that the UK 
was plotting against the EEC. His doubt was plausible because the UK did 
not forgo a relationship with the European Commonwealth in the least, 
including the British Commonwealth Preferential Tariff. Moreover, the UK 
took a highhanded attitude during the negotiation process, which infuriated 
De Gaulle. As a result, De Gaulle finally declared disapproval of the UK 
joining the EU in 1963. Thus, the first attempt of the UK to join the EEC 
was ambivalent regarding showing both its go and stop sides.  
Notwithstanding this first failure, the Wilson government of the Labour 
Party showed a willingness to join the EEC once again. Economic 
difficulties played a large part in applying for the EEC than before. In 
particular, decreasing trade with the Commonwealth countries was a fatal 
blow to the UK. A fiscal crisis and following the monetary crisis in the late 
1960s also contributed to the second try. For these reasons, Wilson officially 
applied for the EEC in 1967. The hostility of De Gaulle against the UK was 
no better then, and De Gaulle wielded the veto once more. It became clear 
that it was virtually impossible for the UK to join the EEC until the 
retirement of De Gaulle. The second go try for the EEC was forcibly 
interrupted by international forces.  
Finally, the UK made a successful application to join the EC in 1973. 
As soon as De Gaulle left office in 1969, Edward Heath, the former Prime 
Minister from 1970–74, rapidly progressed an application for EEC 
membership. Because the Heath government prioritized the problem of 
European integration over other issues, it shrewdly resolved any difficulties 
in negotiation. The UK succeeded in resolving a few issues, such as 
contributions to the EC, the British Commonwealth Preferential Tariff, and 
 
 ５６ 
so forth. After the negotiation with the EC from 1970–72, the UK signed the 
Treaty of Accession, which provided for the accession to the EC ad 
extremum. Notably, the motive for membership was only economic goals. 
The logic for signing up with the EC was to offset deficits from dwindling 
trade with the EC and to enjoy the privilege of the common market. Until 
1973, when the 1972 European Communities Act came into effect, the UK 
thought nothing of keeping sustainable peace in Europe or establishing an 
international system of confederation. Therefore, attachment of the UK to 
the EC cannot be considered a full-blown attempt to integrate Europe. 
Rather, it demonstrates ambivalence of the British foreign policy in the stop-
go cycle.  
In sum, during the first two decades of the postwar era, the foreign 
policy of the UK demonstrated a patterned stop-go cycle. On the one hand, 
the UK endeavored to become an axis state of European integration for its 
own political and economic leverage. On the other hand, the glorious history 
of the British Empire, its status as a victorious state, preferential relationship 
with the Commonwealth, and discredit of other European countries 
hampered the UK from enthusiastically participating in integration. There 
were both encouraging and baffling factors for sharing rosy futures with the 
other European countries. As a result, European policy overlapped with 
repetitive stop and go cycles. 
Many comparative studies treated the stop-go cycle of British foreign 
policy as irregular. According to our review, the UK demonstrated patterned 
behaviors. The UK based its attitude on cost-benefit analyses from an 
economic standpoint. For instance, the chief motive to join the EC was to 
gain benefits of a common market. The UK government made a judgment 
that the EC was the most efficient and sole measure to keep economic 
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competitiveness in the global market. From time to time, the economic 
analysis was complemented with historical legacies. The British did not 
acquire the same knowledge from the war as France or Germany and did not 
see a causality between nation-states centrism and conflicts. There was a 
solid logic of a cost-benefit analysis and the British identity at the bottom of 
what would seem an inconsistent stop and go cycle. Hence, the current 
thesis suggests that the erratic policy of the UK could be understood in a 
patterned cycle with an internal working mechanism. 
Within the overlapping stop and go phases, the hostility of the UK 
against the European continent was gradually sprouting. After the first 
denial of the UK to engage in the Spaak Committee, ulterior exclusion from 
the European community became evident. It is well shown in the repeated 
vetoes that De Gaulle exercised. In contrast, the European countries other 
than the UK also raised an aversion to the selfish nationalistic behaviors of 
the UK. From the perspective of the continent, the cost-benefit analysis that 
the UK conducted was enough for the other European countries to consider 
the UK as not sharing the same sustainable integration program with them. 
In this way, the UK and the European Continent were germinating a seed of 
long-term hostility in both directions, which has continued to the current day. 
 
3.1.2. After Entering the EC (1973–1980) 
 
Even after joining the EC, the UK had to suffer from a few more bitter 
problems stemming from national politics. Because the principal incentive 
to join the EC was to share a portion of economic growth, the economic 
crisis that the UK and Europe encountered in the early 1970s was enough to 
make the UK regret its choice. No sooner did the UK enter the EC than the 
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United States announced its suspension of specie payment in 1971. Shortly 
after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the world economy was 
descending into a recession because of the oil crisis in 1973 and 1979. The 
UK entered the EC and the occurrence of the worldwide recession coincided, 
putting the British economy at a disadvantage. At this juncture, the UK was 
agonizing over the stop-go decision.  
It was Harold Wilson and the Labour Party that took advantage of the 
nationwide schism over the European policy. To handle the split within the 
party, Wilson promised to renegotiate the joining conditions that the 
Conservatives negotiated at the outset and to hold a referendum on whether 
to stay or leave the EC. Because the joining conditions included provisions 
unfavorable to the British economy, the proposal on renegotiation and the 
stay/leave referendum drew electorate support in the general election of 
October 1974. In this way, the Labour Party was able to join the promarket 
and antimarket forces and accomplished a transfer of power.  
Even after the Labour Party came to power, conflicts existed inside the 
ruling party, as well as between parties. Antimarket deputies defined the 
common market as the club of capitalists and they argued to leave the EC. 
In the atmosphere of nationwide division, the British electorate voted on 
whether the UK should stay in the EC. In the June 1975 referendum, the 
turnout rate was 65.5%, and 67.2% of voters answered yes to the question. 
Eventually, the UK became a member state in formality only after 
threatening the other member states of the EC with withdrawal.  
The 1975 referendum was especially a noteworthy phenomenon for 
three reasons. First, factors other than economic interests came into effect 
concerning the UK’s European policy. The UK decided to sign up for the 
EC from sheer economic motives, such as the tariff benefits of a common 
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market, free movement of capital and labor inside the common market, and 
securing a demand base by aggrandizing its economic size. The UK paid 
special regard to its economic interests and collateral effects on its political 
status. None of its communitarian goals, such as keeping a sustainable peace 
in Europe, influenced the decision. Nevertheless, the UK reversed its stance 
on membership several times, from a refusal to join the Spaak Committee to 
finally joining in 1975. Although the net surplus of joining the EC changed 
from time to time, the result of the cost-benefit analysis in economic terms 
consistently encouraged the UK to enter it. Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
expect other influential variables than economic ones.  
When the UK makes a decision about its stance toward the European 
community, the current thesis proposes that the most influential variable is 
ideas. Ideas signify the framework to interpret not only the problematic 
situation, but also the economic interests of actors, political preferences, and 
so forth, while the concrete substances of ideas change over time. For 
instance, joining the EEC was denied at first because ideas including the 
lasting British Empire, nationalism centered on the interests of nation-states, 
British exceptionalism, and distrust of other European countries had deeply 
rooted in the minds of the British. These ideas made political actors see the 
institutional change toward the EEC as being against either their economic 
interests or political status. It was a matter of the perception of interests.  
Second, this was the first time that domestic forces made use of 
international political problems for political means. This was mainly done to 
settle internal conflicts when Wilson suggested a renegotiation of the EC 
joining condition and a stay/leave referendum as a general election pledge. 
The Labour Party was divisive around domestic issues and consisted of 
many internal factions at that time. The party leaders resorted to the EC 
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issues to diffuse attention from heated power struggles in the party and to 
make all the deputies unite around the general election. That is, to 
strategically bring international political issues into the domestic political 
scene was how the party leaders aimed to resolve internal conflicts and to 
differentiate themselves from the Conservative Party simultaneously. Even 
though the Labour Party was able to win more than half of the seats at the 
1974 general election, the UK on the whole came to suffer a series of losses 
because of the referendum strategy. Because of the historical legacies of the 
day, other European countries held suspicion and hostility, finally showing 
signs that the relationship between the UK and the European community 
was strained.  
Finally, although the 2016 Brexit and the 1975 referendum display a 
few points in common, they do not have a mutual relationship. First, two 
events occurred in the atmosphere of division and keen competition in 
domestic politics. It was not until the 1975 referendum that both major 
political parties agreed on European integration and presented a single 
opinion. Even the ruling party was divided into a few factions, including a 
procommon market and an anticommon market. Later in the 2000s, because 
the two major parties were divided into Europhile and Euroscepticist, they 
were flooded with third parties, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP). 
In addition, the leadership of the two major parties was pestered by ability 
absence and a lack of public support in both 2016 and 1975. 
Notwithstanding their commonalities, indeed, it turned out that social forces 
supporting the UK to leave the EC during these two time points were 
irrelevant (Becker et al. 2017).  
The decision was carried out with a lack of conventional political 
leadership; it was the ideas and actors who voluntarily interpreted and 
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utilized ideas that led to the decision. The malfunctioning of the traditional 
policy-making mechanism in 1975 and 2016 is one such facet that 
highlights the importance of ideas for political outcomes. 
 
3.2. Deepening Euroscepticism 
 
3.2.1. Compelling Hostility During the Thatcher Government (1979–
1990) 
 
The stay decision in the 1975 referendum and finally obtaining an EC 
membership did not necessarily connote an amicable relationship between 
the UK and the EC. Shortly after Margaret Thatcher organized her cabinet, 
the relationship worsened rapidly. The British stance toward the EC showed 
stop signs during Margaret Thatcher’s premiership. 
The first problem that arose during her premiership was about the 
British Budgetary Question—or UK Rebate. At the European Council in 
1979, Thatcher clamored to give rebates to the UK. The reason for this was 
that the UK was a carrying an excessive burden on the resources program of 
the EC. It is true that 70% of the EC budget flowed into the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) that the UK did not take advantage of because of 
its small agricultural industry. In addition, the VAT base of the UK against 
the gross national product was higher than other member states. The VAT 
base made the economic competitiveness of the British industry inferior to 
other member states’ industries toward non-European countries.  
The reasons why Thatcher asked for a reformation of the budgetary 
system were obviously persuasive in part. When it comes to the economic 
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grounds, other member states of the EC also assented because they had felt 
the budgetary system made in 1970 had been battered enough to revise. 
Meanwhile, it was the attitude of Thatcher and the UK that fostered hostility. 
During the whole negotiation process, Thatcher explicitly demonstrated 
hostility toward European integration, the feeling that had been latent in the 
British after World War II. The leadership of the other member states had a 
bitter experience, finding the explicit aversion of the UK against European 
integration. When the UK and the EC reached an agreement in 1985, the 
deepened hostility went to extremes. Notwithstanding the acrimonious 
conflicts with other member states, the UK was determined to get back 66% 
of the difference between the amount the UK would pay and that the EC 
would redistribute to the UK.  
In the late 1980s, Thatcher still held a hostile stance toward the EC. 
The Thatcher government went as far as to tellingly disapprove of any 
attempts for a closer integration of Europe. The most notable example was 
her objection to the European Monetary Council (EMU). Jacques Delors, 
the former President of the European Commission, proposed introducing a 
single market for the EC. Against the proposal of Delors, the logic of no 
federation but confederation appeared once again. Thatcher argued that the 
EC with the EMU would strip each nation-state of its sovereignty and 
centralize power. Again, the extent of integration to which the UK would 
tolerate was found to be more obvious and narrower than other member 
states. 
Indeed, the way that the Delors Committee operated was similar to that 
of the Spaak Committee in the late 1950s; it insinuated the weakness of 
British leadership in the process of monetary integration. Furthermore, the 
fact that the German model was adopted instead of the integration plan the 
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City proposed came as a shock regarding the UK’s status in the international 
financial system. Not surprisingly, the UK negatively responded during the 
rest term of Thatcher. Yet in 1990, Thatcher had to resign because of her 
hardline hostility. As the intransigent attitude of the Thatcher government 
continued to increase, the Conservative Party was divided by internal 
conflicts over the European integration issue. Indeed, conflicts inside the 
Conservative Party finally dragged down the most anti-European leader.  
It was Thatcher who arranged the groundwork of Euroscepticism by 
combining historical legacies and facing situations. It also became evident 
that the UK wanted the Single European Act, not the Treaty of Rome of the 
EC. Yet compared with long-standing support for Thatcher as an incarnation 
of hostility toward Europe, the situation soured for her in a sudden and 
unexpected manner. How can we understand the sharp turnover of European 
policy? 
The rapid assuage of a bitter hostility may be partly because of the 
ideas following this thesis. That is, a review of the Thatcher premiership 
also attests to the arguments of a stop-go cycle of the British foreign policy 
and the role of ideas on political outcomes. A division inside the 
Conservative Party and decreasing support rate for Thatcher regarding the 
European policy suggested that it was time to reform the related institutions. 
Specifically, this meant that the political actors wanted to abandon the 
current policy. Thatcher was no exception to the stop-go cycle, a distinctive 
feature of the British institutional path toward foreign policy. 
More importantly, it was because of a changed understanding of 
interests related to the EC that the British political actors no longer wanted a 
stop policy for anything. The UK’s leverage over the EC was still limited, 
and nothing had sharply changed on the cost-benefit analysis regarding 
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European integration. The actual number on the balance sheet did not play a 
significant role in resigning of Thatcher. Rather, it was a matter of the 
perception of interests once again. It was an idea that newly emerged that 
changed everything: globalization. Globalization was precipitated after the 
late 1980s, which made the UK nervous about its economic competitiveness. 
In addition to the substantial trend of globalization, much depended on the 
interpretation of the globalization idea and the fact that the UK might fall 
behind if it did not jump on the globalization trend. The idea of 
globalization and its interpretation exercised influence over reorganizing 
domestic coalitions, such as the split inside the Conservative Party and 
dwindling support over explicit hatred toward European integration. 
 
3.2.2. Neither Yes nor No: Maastricht Treaty and EMU (1992–2007) 
 
Because internal party pressures on the UK’s European policy had 
driven the resignation of Thatcher, John Major assumed a more flexible and 
practical attitude on the issue. He approved intergovernmental negotiations 
on the establishment of the European Union and the EMU. The Major 
government ratified the Treaty of Maastricht, not holding a referendum as 
well. Notwithstanding a little transition of foreign policy, the fundamental 
political lines on European integration were the same as the previous 
government. Still, the reason for the Major government adopting a more 
flexible European policy was not a wholehearted empathy with the 
continental states. On the one hand, it was to secure electorate support in 
domestic politics considering the growing necessity of a common market or 
a single market in economic terms. On the other hand, it was a temporary 
attempt to take the initiative in the European integration debates and to 
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reform the European community in accordance with the British neoliberal 
political economy from an international perspective.  
The UK explicitly prioritized its national interests in European policy 
and made a demarcation between domestic politics and European politics. 
This self-centered way of foreign policy stood out when signing the 
Maastricht Treaty. The Major government demanded the right for an opt-out 
against the social provisions of the treaty as well as joining the EMU. These 
demands were based on the British idea that European integration should be 
carried out based on a nation-state basis, preserving the unqualified 
sovereignty of each member state, which continued after World War II. Only 
a reform of the European Communities into the British neoliberal model 
was acceptable to the UK. Although the Maastricht Treaty enlarged the 
European community from economic integration to closer political 
integration, it was decisive that inserting federal goals into the preface of 
the treaty ended in failure because of the nationalistic efforts of the UK.  
In particular, the financial industry was a central axis that the UK 
considered to be in its national interests. For instance, the UK exercised the 
right of opt-outs not to enter the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. 
Because the EMS was a harbinger of the Eurozone, an opt-out gave a 
compelling hint that the UK would not join the monetary integration of the 
European communities. The opt-out in 1979 was also propelled by the 
perspective of national interests. To the British leadership, joining the EMS 
signified abandoning its sovereignty over monetary control. Along the same 
lines, the UK secured an opt-out right from the process of establishing the 
EMU, an institutional ground of the Eurozone.  
The European policy was a more complicated issue in the view of the 
Labour Party. The conventional position of the Labour Party was to define 
 
 ６６ 
the European community as a capitalist club and to maintain the UK’s 
sovereignty by resisting integrative movements at both the international and 
domestic levels. Because the conventional party program was against 
European integration, it was adventurous to hastily take a pro-EU position. 
Yet Tony Blair changed his direction toward Europe in contrast to the 
traditional party program. One of the most significant achievements on the 
European policy was that he succeeded to unite the Labour Party into his 
program when compared with the divisive Conservative Party. Moreover, he 
strived to be involved in the European integration program rather than 
taking it away from closer integration. He scathingly criticized the 
traditional path the UK had taken, that is, to fixate a permissible degree to 
which the UK can integrate with the EU. Specifically, the Blair government 
gave the Bank of England political independence. He also signed up for the 
European Social Charter, which the previous cabinet refused to join, and the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty, and others. It is uncontradictable that 
Blair took integration with Europe to a whole new level.  
Indeed, we could point out that Blair’s efforts to raise the UK’s degree 
of cooperation were limited as well. His limitation was especially noticeable 
during his second term as prime minister. The UK gave up joining the EMU 
because Blair just could not overcome the opposition inside the Labour 
Party and the Conservative Party. A breakaway from the EMU became a 
critical obstacle for the UK when it came to European politics after then. 
Although the Major government and the Blair government adopted 
different stances regarding European policy, the current thesis suggests that 
both governments demonstrated a tradition stop-go pattern. Established 
shortly after World War II, the stop-go cycle was repeated throughout the 
1990s and the early 2000s. Unlike many conventional studies that assume 
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an irregularity in British policy, the British European policy was obviously 
consistent in that all decisions were made in accordance with the stop-go 
cycle. Under the largely stop position, the Major government kept its 
distance from the EU, although to a lesser degree than the Thatcher 
government. Owing to a turnover in the political regime, the Blair 
government took the go policy despite its defensive nature. In brief, both 
Major and Blair properly adopted either a stop or go policy to achieve 
paradigm conflicts regarding European integration.  
In addition to the consistency and durability of the stop-go cycle in the 
UK, we can discover the importance of ideas when it comes to a referendum. 
As shown in the case of the 1975 referendum, referendum propositions on 
the Maastricht Treaty and the EMU, and the like, whether politicians would 
hold a referendum or not was mainly determined by the predictability of the 
referendum results. In other words, the government determined the 
execution of a referendum only when the results were anticipated to be 
favorable. If we consider a referendum on controversial issues such as the 
political strategy of the actors after the Wilson government, the execution of 
a referendum was significantly affected by the interpretative framework on 
ideas that individual actors have on the given issue. As a consequence, 
regarding the political institution of referendums, ideational changes 
historically played a leading role.  
The referendum decision emphasizes political interactions between 
actors. For instance, the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the City, and 
other voters struggled against whether to join the common market of the EC. 
During this struggle, of course, a cost-benefit analysis from an economic 
view was presupposed as the basis of the debates. Nonetheless, British 
actors put their peculiar ideas before a mere economic calculation, such as 
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nationalism, British exceptionalism, old imperialism, Euroscepticism and 
Europhile, globalization, and so on. Each idea worked as an interpretive 
framework of national interests and alternative foreign policy. Therefore, the 
referendum issue was not only a symbol of direct democracy, but also a 
mirror of the heated discursive interactions between political actors.  
The current thesis finds that the 2016 referendum was neither a 
political break from the historical institutional legacies nor a new 
phenomenon caused by a crippled two-party system of the UK or by 
globalization effects. Rather, the referendum demonstrated a consistent 
pattern of British foreign policy and became a place for the discursive 
interactions of political actors. The same applied in 2016 regarding the 
question and shape of the referendum as well. 
 
3.3. Referendum and Brexit in 2016 
 
The intention of British leadership to engage in the European 
integration program was not to contribute to establishing peace in Europe, 
setting up the European federal by concentrating political and economic 
sovereignty of member states, or achieving complete integration in the 
economic field; their purposes were rather offensive, such as differentiating 
the UK from other European countries, wresting the initiative from the 
existing leader states, increasing its political and economic leverage against 
non-European countries, or enjoying economic interests in a common 
market. Indeed, David Cameron adhered to the same line of thought as 
previous governments.  
The offensive intent toward the European continent were consolidated 
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during the Debt Crisis in the Southern European countries in 2007–08. 
Because the economic crisis, the UK had to go through deficits in its 
financial industry and real economy. To make matters worse, the British 
government had to cut expenses on social security benefits to overcome the 
economic crisis. Confronted with a tightening budget and its direct influence 
toward the social security of actors, not only did Eurosceptic MPs inside the 
Conservative Party sharply increase, but also the UKIP expanded its 
influence in the government. Indeed, the UKIP gained 27.5% of the total 
vote in the 2014 European elections. 
The radically Eurosceptic forces in the Commons insistently demanded 
the Cameron government to hold a referendum. Cameron parried the first 
demand in 2011 but acceded to the second demand in 2015 to resolve 
internal party conflicts and fear of Eurosceptic forces. Shortly after the 
Conservative Party won the general election of 2015, the Cameron 
government passed the European Union Referendum Act 2015 as promised. 
Once again, the referendum and the European integration issues were 
political measures, not a goal itself.  
Euroscepticism was sophisticated, becoming a new social force for 
creating a social divide. Although a feeling of hatred against the continent 
states were deep-rooted and pervaded across the UK, it was not until 
decades after World War II that Euroscepticism developed into political 
ideas and the basis for political behaviors. The period from shortly after 
World War II to the 1970s can be seen as the time when Euroscepticism 
sprang up beyond the extent of just hatred or doubt. Then, during the 
premiership of Thatcher, Euroscepticism was equipped with a combination 
of actors, ideas, and supporting institutions, receiving protection from the 
ruling government. Finally, Euroscepticism became full-fledged after the 
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1990s when the trend of globalization accelerated. In recent years, even 
social divides have arisen along the line of Euroscepticism.  
After the 2000s, ideas regarding the European community were 
exposed to more hostile circumstances. A large number of British people 
ascribed the by-products of globalization such as the global recession, 
increasing numbers of refugees, terrorism, job losses, and so forth to the EU. 
It is plausible that the promise of Cameron for a referendum came from this 
idea fostered by the British people, even though we rule out vague hostility. 
In brief, these kinds of animosity established a major pillar of Brexit ideas 
that will be covered in the next chapter.  
Meanwhile, the growing concept of Euroscepticism was not a linear 
process but rather a repeat of the stop-go cycle. One of the reasons that the 
stop-go cycle was sustainable for numerous decades was that there were no 
systematic opinions from the left side, like the Social Democratic Party of 
the continent states. The Labour Party, often regarded as leftist, did not 
adopt social democratic principles. Even the Labour Party led by Blair 
attempted to expand the British neoliberal economy. Because ideologies 
other than just a stop and go policy did not emerge in the UK, conflicts over 
the European policy were simplified into a repeated stop-go pattern. Not 
surprisingly, the absence of a third philosophy made the British foreign 









Chapter 4. Formation of the Brexit Idea 
 
As examined in the previous chapter, the relationship between the UK 
and the EU has been following a stop-go cycle since the end of World War II. 
Notwithstanding its conformity to a stop-go cycle from a macro perspective, 
every foreign policy of the UK demonstrated its distinctiveness in a 
peculiarity of interactions, discourses, and ideas. Because ideas become a 
fundamental basis for understanding situations, interests, and institutions, 
we could begin our analysis on a specific policy that stems from distinctive 
ideas. This is why chapter 4 investigates the formation of the Brexit Idea. In 
this chapter, we answer the following questions by starting our comparative 
study of the Brexit Idea: How was the Brexit Idea formulated from the 
perspective of the theoretical framework of this thesis? What are the 
detailed substances of the Brexit Idea? Which ideational features best 
describe the Brexit Idea? 
This chapter suggests that the European Debt Crisis and the 2015 
European Migrant Crisis served as the momentum for the most significant 
discourses about Brexit. The principal reason for their significance is that 
the Eurozone Crisis and the European Migrant Crisis were socioeconomic 
challenges developed at the European politics level, hence neither stemming 
from international politics nor national politics. Of course, not only was the 
regional scope of the crises primarily limited to Europe, but the policy 
methods against these problematic situations were carried out by the 
cooperation of member states. Because the issues unfolded with close 
cooperation with the EU member states, not surprisingly, the discourses 
about two issues were a string of interactions between European political 
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actors. It is true that the global economic crisis of 2007–2008 exercised 
more significant impacts on the national economy of European countries. 
The two issues of this chapter, however, have a more intimate relationship 
with generating discursive interactions in Europe. Notwithstanding the 
larger numerical impact of the global economic crisis, it was the European 
Debt Crisis that significantly influenced British awareness of European 
integration. Therefore, if we are to understand Brexit under its own context, 
the European Debt Crisis and the European Migrant Crisis should be 
highlighted. 
In addition, the two cases also can reveal the structural problems 
embedded in the EU. One of the typical structural problems of the EU is that 
economic disparity is remarkable between a few leader states and the rest. 
Because economic integration in the European region started with a small 
group of states shortly after World War II, a degree of economic growth and 
development remained differentiated from country to country. The result 
was the accruing trade surplus of core countries and government deficits in 
the periphery countries. Though the economic gap was endeavored to be 
slightly adjusted by the flow of goods, capital, and labor from the core 
countries to the periphery ones, the economic inequality finally incarnated 
in the financial crisis of the Southern European countries.  
Likewise, the European Migrant Crisis is partially resulting from 
another structural problem of the EU. The EU had to implement strict 
immigration policy at both its inside and outside barriers to increase the 
internal flexibility of labor, goods, and capital and to shut off a negative 
influence from outside the EU. Owing to its double-sided immigration 
policy, the EU got into trouble when immigrants from outside would want to 
settle and travel inside the EU without any limitation. In other words, the 
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boundary between outside exclusiveness and inside integrity became blurry 
because of the constant influx of immigrants. It was the European Migrant 
Crisis in 2015 that the incapability of the EU in resolving its intrinsic 
structural problem on integration materialized.  
Among the controversial issues in the UK, the European Debt Crisis 
and the European Migrant Crisis were where the intertwinement of domestic 
politics with international politics can be best seen. Not only domestic 
actors such as political parties, industry, voters, and so forth, but also 
international actors such as the EU and its member nation-states engaged in 
Brexit, positively accouching the related discourses and ideas. Because the 
current thesis explores the complicated interactions among international and 
domestic actors, these two cases fit well into the goal of this thesis.  
In brief, this chapter investigates the European Debt Crisis and the 
2015 European Migrant Crisis to analyze the formulating process of the 
Brexit Idea. As mentioned above, the current thesis is interested in 
international and domestic politics as the site where the Brexit idea was 
created. First and most importantly, this chapter explores the relationship 
between two socioeconomic challenges, the recognition of inequality by 
political sovereignty and economic growth, the ideas of deglobalization, 
neonationalism, and Euroscepticism, all of which are closely related to 
Brexit. During this exploration, discursive interactions among actors by 
means of ideas are especially highlighted.  
Next, the current thesis illuminates a feature of the Brexit Idea using 
the proposed analytic framework. Because the Brexit Idea is composed of 
numerous understandings of actors, this chapter first classifies the elements 
of the Brexit Idea. Using this classification, the Brexit Idea might become 
explicit in revealing a relationship with the mobilizing process. Then, if the 
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Brexit Idea has characteristics of either internal or external fragility, a 
relationship between features of ideas and institutional changes will be 
answered. The discussion in this chapter fundamentally assumes dynamics 
of ideas. 
 
4.1. Recurring Socioeconomic Challenges and Responses 
 
Section 4.1 elaborates on the development process of the European 
Debt Crisis and European Migrant Crisis in 2015, emphasizing the political 
responses that the EU and its member states made. 
 
4.1.1. Economic Challenge: European Debt Crisis since 2009 
 
In 2009, the European Debt Crisis began to move from just the 
government deficit and default of the Southern European countries, 
including Spain, Portugal, Italy, and so forth. It lasted a few years and left 
behind a momentous scar on the EU concerning the genuine integration of 
nation-states. In essence, the European Debt Crisis is generally assumed to 
have occurred because of the intrinsic structural problems of the 
Eurozone—a currency union without a fiscal union. Because the EU lacks a 
measure of fiscal policy and joint funds, it was not able to transfer finances 
to the countries in crisis. The absence of a joint policy measure in the fiscal 
area was rooted in a fundamental rule of the EU: the EU kept fiscal stability 
inside the community by applying strict regulations rather than providing 
fiscal help to member states. For instance, the Maastricht Treaty set a degree 
of government deficits and debts, and yet the Southern European countries 
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ignored this standard after the 2000s.  
In addition to the underlying structural problem, the Eurozone Crisis 
chiefly occurred in the capital and financial sector. The launch of the Euro in 
1999 was immediately followed by a flow of credits from the leader states 
such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands to the rest members of the 
EU and from the consumer boom in the periphery as well. Unfortunately, 
the consumer boom and animated investment in the periphery countries 
were just temporary because the mentioned economic phenomenon brought 
about trade and government deficits to these periphery countries, which 
became an unbearable burden for them. In particular, easy but massive 
amounts of credits allowed banks in the periphery countries to invest in 
high-risk, high-return items. When the 2007–2008 global economic crisis 
occurred, the Southern European countries had to provide a bailout for the 
broken banking sector following the burst of real estate bubbles and credit 
supply disruptions in the region. In other words, similar to the 2007–2008 
global economic crisis, the easy capital enabled by a common market started 
a recession.  
We must also note the policy reactions that the EU and each member 
state adopted, along with the structural cause of the Eurozone Crisis. Above 
all, the EU established temporary organizations, including the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM), to provide rescue funds to the countries in debt. It was 
the leader countries of the EU that mainly engaged in the operation of the 
EFSF and EFSM. For instance, the EFSF raised funds to provide loans to 
countries in crisis and private banks and to take over government debts by 
issuing bonds. Activities related to the issuing of new bonds were supported 
by the German Debt Management Office. In addition,  the bond issues 
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were guaranteed by the Eurozone member states, whose guaranteed amounts 
were proportionate to the investment money at the European Central Bank 
(ECB). Along with efforts of the EFSF and EFSM, the ECB independently 
ran open market operations for buying sovereign and private debts as well. 
This measure became feasible because the ECB changed the policy in favor 
of countries in crisis. For instance, most kinds of national debts accredited 
by countries in crisis were accepted despite their low credit ratings. When it 
came to affording financial aid, it was principally the axis state of the ECB, 
represented by Germany, that took charge.  
It is remarkable that leader countries provided financial assistance 
under the rigorous condition of tight financing. The leader countries 
forcefully put pressure on other countries in crisis to reduce government 
spending if they wanted to receive financial help. The more the leader 
countries took lead in a conciliatory policy, the more they could in a 
hardline policy. For example, according to the European Fiscal Compact 
signed in 2011, Eurozone member states would face a penalty in case they 
exceeded either 3% of government deficits or 60% of government debts to 
their gross domestic production. This punitive method was chiefly directed 
by Germany. Likewise, efforts to make the fiscal rule of the Eurozone much 
stricter, including the European Fiscal Compact, were made by only a small 
number of member states, such as Germany and France. Along with the 
initiative of France and Germany, since the Eurozone community had built 
up objective and quantitative fiscal regulations, it could be said that the 
bureaucrats of the community came to obtain sovereignty over the member 
states.  
Even the result of the EU policy measures produced unequal results for 
its member states. Although Germany and the UK rapidly recovered their 
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economies after 2010, the Southern European countries remained in a 
recession. For instance, Germany regained a fixed capital investment rate 
equivalent to the one before the crisis. In contrast with Germany, fixed 
capital investment, unemployment, wage decrease, high tax rates, and other 
economic indicators show that Southern European countries such as Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, and so on still did not recover from the crisis (Park 2017).  
From the economic challenge that the EU encountered in 2009, the EU 
made collaborative efforts. Instead of countries in crisis without feasible 
policy measures, it was the European community and its member states that 
led the problem-solving process. What is more significant, however, is the 
actual actors who formed and conducted the joint policy: the leader 
countries such as Germany and France. 
Notwithstanding its logical clarity, the fact that the community policy 
was steered by the key countries contains an undertone of inequality. Even if 
the member states are assumed to have an equal status in the EU, their 
political leverage inside the community explicitly turned out to be different. 
Moreover, having different leverage over the decision of the EU policy 
might show that the sovereignty of the member states varies. This would run 
counter to the spirit of intensifying integration for which the EU sought 
from the beginning. The principle of sovereign equality was thought to be 
violated in conjunction with economic inequality inherent from the 
beginning.  
In addition, the fact that the UK successfully ended a plan for new 
financial treaties threw a sidelight on the problematic feature of the EU’s 
decision-making system. Shortly after the Eurozone Crisis, EU leaders 
wanted to change existing EU treaties on financial regulations. Although 
most EU leaders agreed upon an amendment plan on shabby treaties 
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following the lead of François Hollande, Cameron succeeded in interrupting 
this plan by demanding an exemption of the City. The fact that just one 
member state can readily check an agreed intent of the greater part 
demonstrates a structural problem of the EU as a community of sovereign 
states aiming at a federation as the ultimate goal.  
Not only a difference during the policy-making process, but also the 
substances of the policy alluded to inequality among the states. Most 
remarkably, the bailout program for the indebted governments and central 
and private banks were mainly offered by the Troika, which consists of the 
IMF, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Although the Troika assumes to bailout creditors with tolerance, they 
virtually forced the countries in crisis to tighten government spending and 
raise taxes, even to an undue extent. The aided countries also had to 
decrease their spending on social security, which affected the lower class 
more during this economic recession. The countries in crisis had to suffer 
popular grievance, reaching a social unrest because of these austerity 
measures. Even though the avowed aim of the austerity drive was to 
facilitate the financial aid, substantial implications might be the 
infringement of economic sovereignty.  
Finally, the results of economic recovery after the cooperative relief 
measures turned out to be much more disparate from state to state. As 
mentioned above, the inequivalent economic performance of the member 
states appeared in the form of growth rates, amounts of capital investment, 
unemployment rate, or the consumer dissatisfaction index. These recovery 
gaps can be concurrently attributed to recognizing the inequality among 
European citizens.  
In sum, although the economic challenge that happened in the 
 
 ７９ 
European community was not as destructive as the Great Depression in the 
early twentieth century, it was enough to betray the structural problem 
embedded from the outset and to drive the European citizenry to recognize 
this problematic structure. The dominant way of interactions during the 
Eurozone Crisis could be told as a one-way delivery of message and 
unwilling compliance to the given message. 
 
4.1.2. Social Challenge: European Migrant Crisis in 2015 
 
Along with the economic challenge, it was the 2015 European Migrant 
Crisis that hurt the faith of the European citizen in its community. To tell the 
conclusion first, the European Migrant Crisis exposed both structural 
problems intrinsic to the EU and the inequality found during the Eurozone 
Crisis. The European Migrant Crisis was intensified because the burden of 
massive numbers of immigrants into Europe was concentrated into the 
relatively disadvantaged countries of the region and that a resolution to the 
problem was steered by national interests of the leader countries, which was 
seemingly contrary to the principle of equal sovereignty. This social 
challenge was also full of a one-sided delivery of instruction and a lop-sided 
aspect of interactions among member states.  
Historically, Europe has experienced the entry of immigrants into its 
boundaries from other continents. Yet it was not until the twentieth century 
that immigrants across the Mediterranean Sea or the Southeast Europe 
proliferated. Regarding the pattern of immigration after the twentieth 
century, the European community seriously regarded the inflow of 
immigrants from the politically or economically disadvantaged regions as a 
critical cause for social unrest. The inflow of immigrants outside the 
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community overlapped with movement inside the community, such as 
immigration from Eastern Europe to Western Europe to find a job. Among 
the continuous movement of immigrants into Europe, the European Migrant 
Crisis in 2015 indicates an incredibly surging number of immigrants, 
especially from Muslim countries in Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, 
and Africa. The inflow of immigrants was taken seriously by the EU 
because the immigrants coming after 2010 wanted to permanently reside in 
Europe.  
The gravity of the massive inflow of immigrants kept growing, 
especially concentrating in the countries with economic difficulties. As 
noted above, the so-called periphery countries were directly hit by the 
Eurozone Crisis in 2009, and their recovery rate was tardier than the leader 
countries. With this being the case, the flock of immigrants into the 
Southern European countries was virtually beyond the economic capabilities 
of these countries. Consequently, the Mediterranean countries were 
incapable of fulfilling neither the Schengen Agreement nor the Dublin 
Regulation ④  regarding immigrants. According to existing treaties on 
immigration, the Mediterranean countries should deal with large-scale 
immigration, which was implausible. As a result, the conventional 
agreement on handling the issue of immigrants came to a halt. 
In this process, the EU policy was controlled by the leader countries, 
which did not consider the situation and will of others. For instance, with 
                                            
④ The Dublin Regulation decided which member state is responsible for an application of 
immigrants into the European community. As a key institution of the Dublin System, the 
Dublin Regulation defines a responsible country for immigrant asylum and process to 
transfer them. In principal, the responsible member state for the asylum is where 
immigrants visit the first time they enter the EU. 
 
 ８１ 
Austria, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced in September 
2015 that refugees would be welcomed by Austria and Germany when 
crossing the border from Hungary. Placing aside the compliments on her 
announcement as humanitarian, her decision signified that the application of 
the Dublin Regulation on Syrian refugees would be terminated inside the 
Schengen region. That is, Germany decided to control its borders without 
consultations at the EU level or with other member states. As a result, 
member states other than Austria and Germany had to manage their borders 
regardless of the immigration regulations established by the democratic 
decision-making process at the community level. Merkel’s announcement 
virtually connoted that the immigrant problem would be left to the decision 
of each member state rather than the EU. Much like before entering into the 
Maastricht system, national borders at the European region were demarcated 
based on a nation-states-centered system once again. 
When it comes to the joint policy of the member states, most 
remarkably, the European Commission planned to cooperatively process 
immigrants through the European Asylum Support Office, and Merkel also 
proposed allocating a quota on accepting refugees to each member state. 
Although the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia made a 
declaration that they were unwilling to adopt a distribution plan of the EU, 
the European Union interior ministers approved a relocation plan by a 
majority vote. The main reason that most participant countries criticized the 
relocation plan was its lack of democracy, demonstrating the decision-
making process of the European Commission. The result of the opposition 
was raising a physical wall against each nation-state without the deliberation 
process of the community.  
The absence of problem solving was found to be against the initial 
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integration program of European integration. Instead of internal consultation 
based on equal sovereignty and esprit de corps, the EU had to take 
advantage of Turkey, which is outside the European community, to solve the 
refugee problem and internal conflicts. In 2016, the EU was determined to 
send immigrants to Turkey, where these immigrants would be examined and 
sent again to European countries. In other words, the EU managed to settle 
the refugee crisis by externalizing the problem, not by genuine cooperation 
and integrative efforts that every member state and its citizen expected. 
The refugee crisis accompanied cooperative reactions at the EU level, 
similar to the Eurozone Crisis. The EU proportionately relocated and 
resettled immigrants into member states, made the list of Safe Countries of 
Origin, installed the European Border and Coast Guard by upgrading the 
existing border patrol, and conducted negotiations with Turkey. All policy 
measures were carried out under the name of the European community with 
the intent of resolving these immigration problems. Yet here, as elsewhere, 
this collective policy making was driven by the leader countries. For 
instance, it was the German government that decisively modified the 
application of Dublin Regulations and Schengen Agreement and publicly 
declared the immigration issue as a political matter, not an administrative or 
technical one. That is, the declaration of Merkel directly triggered the 
rebirth of a nation-states system because of immigration. Germany, as a 
leader country of the EU, could be considered to exert dominance over the 
whole collective policy in a regard that it took a lead in defining a problem, 
which became the foundation of ulterior actions. According to the 
theoretical perspective of the current thesis, what Merkel did about the 
refugee crisis was to create a dominant understanding of the given problem.  
As another example, when the EU decided to distribute immigrants 
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proportionately to the country’s economic size and population size, the EU 
ignored the opinion of the Central European countries such as Hungary, 
Romania, Czech Republic, and Slovakia and pushed ahead with its 
resettlement initiative. This initiative not only intensified inner community 
conflicts, but also revealed the inequality of EU decision making, especially 
regarding geographic and democratic barriers. The same inequal sovereignty 
in the Eurozone cases is found in immigration policy as well. Instead of 
deliberation on socioeconomic challenges based on equality, the EU adopted 
a hierarchical way of decision making with the message delivered from the 
leader countries to the other member states and non-European states.  
The effectiveness of national policy preemptively taken by the leader 
countries overrode the decision of the community. For instance, when the 
German government arbitrarily expressed its volition to receive Syrian 
refugees regardless of the Dublin and Schengen Agreement, other member 
states had no choice but to be abide by Merkel’s preemptive declaration. 
Shortly after the declaration, for instance, Hungary built a fence along the 
Serbian and Croatian border on 15 September 2015 and on 16 October 2015, 
respectively,  arguing that it was a countermeasure against illegal 
immigrants. Likewise, France, Austria, Sweden, and so forth had to adopt 
measures for tougher border enforcement. It is plausible to say that the 
German foreign policy superseded agreements of the community—the 
Schengen Agreement and Dublin Regulation.  
Moreover, cooperation in this joint policy was slow because most 
member states prioritized their own national interests and discounted the 
goals and virtues of the community. For example, after the EU reached a 
deal with Turkey on 20 March 2016, immigrants arriving at the 
Mediterranean countries were to be sent to Turkey, and Syrian refugees at 
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Turkey would be sent where they hoped to go following the deal. However, 
the Southern European countries lacked the appropriate administrative and 
economic measures to accept and send immigrants, and other member states 
remained spectators because they did not want immigrants to arrive at their 
borders. This also confirms the point that the EU member states overlooked 
democratic goals inside the community for the sake of their own national 
interests. 
 
4.1.3. Development of Inequality Discourses 
 
Our review of the European Debt Crisis and the 2015 European 
Migrant Crisis hint at the inequalities among nation-states and among the 
actors, which developed into political discourses in the 2000s. Accordingly, 
this section organizes the various dimensions of inequality and the way 
inequality turned into political discourses, which are the ideational 
framework of the Brexit Idea.  
The current thesis suggests that the structural defects of the EU were 
preliminary to the behaviors and remarks of the EU member states. Even 
before the inequalities were reinforced by the actual behavior of the actors, 
an inherent structural deficiency was embedded in the EU. The Eurozone as 
a currency union without a fiscal union could be criticized as a 
representative structural problem of the EU. Although monetary policy and 
fiscal policy should be adopted at times of crisis to get back to an 
equilibrium, the Eurozone had just a monetary policy and was not able to 
efficiently adjust the market economy as expected. For instance, in the case 
of the Eurozone Crisis, the EU could not afford financial funding to the 
countries in crisis because it lacked joint funding resources. In other words, 
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member states handed monetary policy measures to the community and had 
only fiscal policy, and the EU, as a structurally deficient integration, was 
without fiscal measures to use. The Southern European countries were being 
tormented by fiscal hardships, and thus, their hands were tied by the fiscal 
policy. As a result, the countries in crisis had no choice but to rely on the 
capital resources of leader countries. Because of its structure, it was 
inevitable the EU would develop a hierarchal system around capital.  
In addition to the inherent structural deficiency, inequality was more 
explicitly revealed in actual practices. First, the member states were divided 
into a leading group and others during the process of joint policy making, 
and the leader countries exerted more influence on the EU policy. During 
the Eurozone Crisis, the actual policy decision was carried out in the 
European Commission, the ECB, or other bureaucratic organizations rather 
than the European Parliament (EP). This implies that countries with more 
say inside bureaucratic organizations were more efficient in determining 
political outcomes. The principle of sovereignty equality in the EP had little 
practical relevance while the whole policy-making process was dominated 
by differential leverage based on a country’s national economy, military 
superiority, and so on. In particular, the tendency to degenerate the EP into a 
name-only organization was noticeable more and more as the controversial 
issues of globalization poured in.  
Considering these unfair disparities, it stood to reason that the 
European actors would develop political discourses on these inequalities. 
One of main inequality arguments was that the EU coaxed economic 
sovereignty over its member states under the pretext of complete integration 
and distributed it to a few leader countries. Both in the European Debt Crisis 
and the 2015 European Migrant Crisis, those who rose to the political 
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forefront were individual political players using a nation-state system rather 
than the EU as a community. Because the limited use of economic policy 
and refrained engagement in policy making was present, the political actors 
of domestic politics came to perceive that sovereignty in the field of national 
economy and politics was deprived of them. This was accompanied by 
grievances that the leader countries exercised more sovereignty in the EU 
than their own shares. 
Although the leader countries were paramount in resolving 
socioeconomic challenges, it does not necessarily mean that there was not a 
recognition or dissatisfaction of the inequalities in the EU. The leader 
countries claimed they also yielded their sovereignty in that they would 
have to bear further burdens for other member states and have no other 
options but to do so. Similar to the follower countries, they expressed their 
concern over the violation of sovereignty by supranational organizations. 
This was why they suggested a detailed program on European integration at 
first and then rejected it when the program was to be carried out.  
Our review of the two socioeconomic challenges also confirms the 
inequality perceived by the leader countries. Even though the countries who 
were struck by economic crisis were not the leader countries, they had to 
pay extraordinary amounts to helps the countries in crisis get out of the 
recession. In the sense that the leader countries had to reluctantly sacrifice 
for other member states from time to time, inequality discourses in 
European politics took hold in the leader countries as well. That is, 
inequality discourses were backed by their deterioration of sovereignty and 
decrease in national interests by the supranational community. The follower 
countries were not the only ones who experienced inequality in sovereignty 
and confronted the democratic rule inside the EU. The leader countries also 
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developed their own logic on inequality. As a result, recognition of the 
emergence of inequality and the related discourses were prevalent across the 
EU member states almost without exception.  
Meanwhile, the European Debt Crisis and the 2015 European Migrant 
Crisis were a tipping point when looking at this from the ideational 
approach. The recognition of the inequalities and related discourses 
gradually pervaded after globalization, and these two issues were indicators 
that demonstrated the proliferation of discourses. The forces against an 
inefficient EU led by the leader countries were organized into a few streams 
around the inequality discourses: they were movements of neonationalism, 
deglobalization, neoprotectionism, Euroscepticism, and so on. In brief, what 
is significant in relation to Brexit was not a series of crises as phenomena 
but the inequality perception and its discourses, which frames the Brexit 
Idea. 
Then, how could we systematically organize the recognition of 
inequality into various dimensions? How was Euroscepticism sophisticated 
into the inequality discourses through a series of socioeconomic challenges? 
By all accounts, the sources of the inequality discourses that flourished after 
the early 2000s can be traced back to the rapid movement of globalization 
and the additional efforts of interstate integration for the sake of a national 
economy. Across advanced capitalism, the dominant themes after World War 
II were an open economy, liberal market, and globalization. As a part of 
keeping economic competitiveness in the globalized market, the European 
nation-states built their rosy dream of European integration. This is why the 
European countries agreed to pull down inside borders and achieve a single 
market with a laissez-faire style that was permitted to members only. Once 
the approximate goal of European integration was set as a tool for national 
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competitiveness, the backlash against it appeared. Therefore, the inequality 
discourses were one kind of backlash, and their knowledge developed in the 
opposite direction of globalization. This is why the current thesis 
investigates the development of the inequality discourses from the 
perspective of its interrelationship with globalization. In this context, the 
inequality discourses are understood in two ways: inequality among nation-
states and inequality among actors. 
First, the inequality among nation-states was centered on the 
sovereignty issues described above. With great expectations of the benefits 
that regional integration would give to member states, the European 
countries bumped into basic problems when they started to construct a 
community. Although they thought the European countries were sharing 
similar initiatives in their integration programs, all of them sought a wide 
spectrum of different plans. For instance, France and Germany supported a 
form of federation, whereas the UK argued for a confederation. Because 
their preferences and interests differed because of national interests, it was 
nearly impossible to agree on the extent to which they could entrust 
supranational organizations with a substantial part of their sovereignty.  
As a result, the communities of the European countries had to keep the 
scope of the mandate to a minimum or to force a few member states more 
than a minimum of transferring sovereignty. Until now, the European 
community has lacked sophistication in drawing an adequate line for nation-
states and the EU. In other words, the immaturity in dealing with interstate 
cooperation and integration could be considered an underlying obstacle for 
the EU ab initio. Because inequality among nation-states unfolded at the 
international political level, knowledge of it was effectual at developing 
international discourses.  
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Second, the inequality among actors was intensified, owing to the 
globalization of production. As it proliferates across the world, nation-states 
and domestic coalitions are divided into groups either benefiting or losing 
from the globalization of production. For instance, it is often argued that 
advanced capitalist countries experience outsourcing and hollowing-out that 
may trigger the destruction of their industrial ecosystems. The United States 
is a typical example of nation groups losing from the globalization of 
production. On the contrary, the receiving countries are often deemed to 
gain from globalization effects. In addition to the categorization of states, 
domestic coalitions can also be separated following the cost-benefit analysis 
of globalization of production. It is argued that the high flexibility of labor 
markets after globalization make favorable environments for high-skilled 
employees, high-tech employers, and capitalists and vice versa for low-
skilled employees, agriculturalists, and so on (Berger 2005; Breznitz and 
Zysman 2013). 
These new divides also played a role in spreading inequality 
recognition among political actors. Even if inequality among actors was 
often found in domestic society, it also buttressed the inequality discourses 
at the international political level through the actors who frequently cross 
the border. From time to time, domestic coalitions allied by interests beyond 
national borders share the inequality perception at the international level.  
In summary, there was a growing tendency to recognize inequality 
among both states and actors and the European Debt Crisis and the 2015 
European Migrant Crisis showed this tendency. The inequality discourses 
were intensified after rapid globalization as the socioeconomic challenges 
and countermeasures against it were repeated and as real actors formed an 
understanding of the inequality of sovereignty, industry, coalition, and 
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others. Beyond a feeling of hostility or doubt, inequality discourses firmly 
were established as one of main discourses in European politics. 
 
4.2. What is the Brexit Idea? 
 
The principal theme of the current thesis has been how ideas wield 
influence over institutional changes and how these ideas are formulated and 
mobilized. Our review of the institutional environments of the UK–EU 
relationship, the Eurozone Crisis, and the 2015 European Migrant Crisis 
validated the theoretical framework. Now, we need to focus on the 
underlying ideas to understand the behavior of real actors. For instance, 
although it was the Mediterranean countries that went through the social and 
economic crisis, the Western and Northern European countries developed 
far-right populism and its supporting parties in a progressive way. In 
particular, the domestic coalitions in the leader countries stressed the 
importance of sovereignty. During the Eurozone Crisis, domestic coalitions 
in the Western countries assisted in raising a wall against each other to block 
the expansion of an economic crisis. By the same logic, they also decided to 
control national borders by themselves rather than mandate control to the 
EU. Even a few far-right groups organized physical attacks against people 
who were not citizens.  
If we are to predicate existing institutionalism or historicism, backlash 
from socioeconomic challenges should have an impact in proportion with 
the damage these challenges cause. Then, the negative effects of the 
challenges must have been graver in the Southern European countries or the 
frontline countries when it came to the refugee inflow. This is because 
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conventional comparative studies often consider the cost-benefit analysis as 
the principal drive for an actor’s behavior. Indeed, the policy outcomes in 
reality were different from what most comparativists expected.  
The incongruity between the expectation of conventional studies and 
what actually happened confirms the argument of the current thesis that 
ideas play a critical role in the possibility and direction of institutional 
changes. It is not a result of the cost-benefit analysis but the interpretation of 
them that finally draws the policy outcomes. The significance of these ideas 
often reaches to an extent that the actual numbers cannot intervene in the 
policy-making process. In extreme circumstances, the facts are often taken 
advantage of only to prove the already proposed ideas rather than to 
formulate or adjust these ideas. Therefore, the argument that institutional 
changes principally depend on related ideas and that other causes such as 
economic factors, power struggles, and so forth play collateral roles were 
verified in the two cases. 
Therefore, this chapter first scrutinizes how the Brexit Idea was 
developed based on the inequality discourses prevalent in Europe. In 
particular, the present thesis focuses on how the inequality discourses were 
modified and then introduced into British politics. The political mechanism 
of changing international political discourses into domestic discourses will 
be investigated. The Brexit Idea was found to have an intertwined 
relationship with the inequality discourses of European politics. As 
examined in the previous section, the British actors recognized the 
inequality of sovereignty and economy at the European political level. In 
conjunction with long-term hostile relationships with the European 
community, the British actors developed ideas against the dominant 
paradigms of the EU, such as regional integration, a single free market, 
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globalization, and so forth. Subsequently, the British actors developed their 
ideas of deglobalization, Euroscepticism, and neonationalism in opposition 
to large megatrends—globalization and European integration. In the British 
context, these thoughts were incorporated into the Brexit Idea, constituting 
the main pillars of it.  
In sequence, this chapter analyzes a feature of the Brexit Idea. Here, 
not all ideas succeed in changing institutions, and institutional changes 
depend on the specific features of the related ideas. In this respect, we 
ruminate on whether the Brexit Idea fulfilled the necessary conditions for 
institutional changes. The conclusion is that the Brexit Idea has internal 
fragility and external solidity. Because the Brexit Idea is firmly nestled in 
the British society, there were heated debates about the European integration, 
drawing lines of social divides along pro- or anti-EU. Notwithstanding its 
external solidity, the Brexit Idea is internally so fragile that relevant debates 
are controversial, leading policy-making processes to a deadlock.  
To sum up, the Brexit Idea can be understood in the aspects of its 
development, substances, and features. How the Brexit Idea realized an 
institutional change in the field of foreign policy will be explained in the 
next chapter. 
 
4.2.1. Constructing the Brexit Idea at three levels 
 
The inequality discourses proliferated because of EU politics, as seen 
in the previous section. These inequality discourses unfolded around two 
key dimensions. First, inequality in sovereignty was asserted in that the EU 
member states transferred their policy-making rights and were forced to 
comply with the EU’s decision, which was led by a few leader countries. 
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The leader countries had to bear the burdens of all of the EU and developed 
their own reasoning for inequalities. The decision-making process of the EU 
did not operate well enough to resolve these socioeconomic challenges and 
thus to guarantee democratic equality inside the community. Furthermore, 
the structural problem of the EU underlies this issue. It was not only all the 
conditions of the national economies of member states, but also a limited 
form of integration devoid of valid policy measures, that created these 
inequalities. It was apparent that the member states shared inequality 
discourses on the grounds of European politics.  
The inequality discourses of international politics were adopted into 
domestic society through the medium of political actors. When it comes to 
introducing international discourses, the most important part here is that the 
international discourses combined with the existing institutions and 
historical legacies of the host countries. In the case of the UK, the UK–EU 
relationship was embedded in understanding the British actors and British 
society. To be specific, long-lasting hostility toward the continental 
European countries first determined the stop-go pattern of UK foreign policy. 
Then, the long-term hostility and stop-go policy consolidated the path 
dependency throughout the postwar period. Not only a feeling of 
Euroscepticism, but also its supporting institutions penetrated into the 
understanding of the British actors. Because the actors who introduced the 
inequality discourses into national politics evidently recognized the historic 
hostility that predominantly constituted institutional environments, the 
existing institutions and inequality discourses were bound to be 
amalgamated. In brief, the inequality discourses were incorporated with 
domestic institutions and the relevant ideas of the actors in the initial phase.  
Before describing how inequality discourses comply with existing 
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institutions, one analytic conclusion is going to be suggested first. The 
Brexit Idea is represented by the following three thoughts: deglobalization, 
Euroscepticism, and neonationalism at the international, regional, and 
national levels, respectively. By classifying the Brexit Idea into three themes, 
the development of the Brexit Idea can be understood as an emergence of 
rival interpretations of globalization. If we see the Brexit Idea as chiefly 
being composed of deglobalization, Euroscepticism, and neonationalism, 
these three ideas could be placed into the context of globalization debates. 
The current thesis proves that it was primarily globalization and the 
repeated responses of the European community to globalization that created 
the Brexit Idea. To put it concretely, globalization emphasizes the principle 
of a single market, free trade, and free capital and labor movement; it also 
highlights the significance of technology and innovation for industrial 
competitiveness. Under globalization, European advanced capitalism could 
take advantage of regional integration for its economic competitiveness; the 
European capitalist countries were to reorganize their industrial structure by 
means of the EU. 
Indeed, the European countries were originally meant to utilize 
European integration in to keep peace in Western Europe. Either to 
precipitate economic development or rival the U.S. economy was an 
ancillary goal. Yet after rapid globalization in the 1990s, the European 
countries thought economic integration inside Europe would be a key 
enabler in improving their competitiveness. Whether the goal was to keep 
peace or to increase their competitiveness did not matter when it came to the 
form of an integrative program, however. The European integration program 
consistently demanded its member states to abandon tradition international 
political systems composed of individual nation-states. Not surprisingly, 
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they had to inevitably open their territories to other member states to deepen 
integration.  
Yet there were critical obstacles for the UK to efface its barriers with 
others. In essence, the existing institutional environments were opposed to 
integration. There was an inveterate feeling of hostility against Europe, 
especially the continental states, something seen throughout British history. 
Moreover, this feeling of hostility was elaborated in Euroscepticism, which 
could be considered as a political paradigm. The traditional institutions of 
the UK were rather unfriendly against supranational integration in this 
respect. 
In addition, the economic necessity of the UK joining the EU was also 
unfavorable to the EU’s integration when compared with other members. 
When the UK joined the EC in 1972, their primary aim was to assist the 
City by securing the free movement of capital in Europe, which would 
support the growth of its representative industry. Except for the financial 
industry, the successive British governments reckoned they were not 
deriving benefits from the EEC or EU. The perception that economic gains 
were absent had decisive effects, resulting in the Thatcher government 
clamoring to get their money back or else withdraw from the EU.  
The unpleasant cohabitation with the continental countries continued 
even in the economic realm. For instance, the rates of economic recovery 
were different from country to country after the Eurozone Crisis. Compared 
with economic performance before recession, although the UK recovered its 
full-fledged economic capacity, some member states such as Greece, Italy, 
Spain, and even France and Germany fell behind in many economic 




Observing the performances of other member states, the UK supposed 
that its swift recovery from the recession was by virtue of its arm’s-length 
distance from the EU. The UK considered that when economies are more 
open to one another, economic crisis spreads more easily. Owing to the 
contagiousness of economic crisis and relatively far distance with the EU, 
the UK was less susceptible to it. In sum, the UK had a chip on its shoulder 
when it came to its cost-benefit analysis of the EU. The expenditure on the 
EU and decreases in social security spending far outweighed interests 
provided by the EU. Instead of a cost-benefit analysis, what mattered to the 
British actors was the unfavorably processed interpretation of the real 
number.  
In addition to economic recognition, the UK also refused European 
integration. The British government outrightly expressed animosity against 
EU social policy. It is well-known that the Major government opted-out of 
the initial social chapter. The fact that the UK did not generally share social 
virtues with other member states came to the front in the case of the 2015 
European Migrant Crisis once again. The UK refused the EU policy 
regarding the refugee problem, including the redistribution program, joint 
financial burden, and so on at the initial phase of the crisis. It did not want 
to transfer its sovereignty or spend more for this problem. Fundamentally, 
conflicts emerged from different understandings of basic concepts such as 
social virtues and international political systems. Although the continental 
countries achieved various goals through a community, the UK still adhered 
to traditional international systems based on a nation-state system with a 
self-help doctrine. Even the UK seemed to keep its glorious past as a 
unipolar hegemony.  
After considering all the factors causing an unfavorable stance toward 
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the EU, it is reasonable that the inequality discourses were introduced in the 
form of deglobalization, Euroscepticism, and neonationalism. Adopting 
inequality discourses to domestic society was equivalent to the endless 
interpretation of the discourses. As a part of international politics, inequality 
discourses had to be interpreted and understood by political actors for 
domestic use. Because the British actors already had Eurosceptic institutions 
and actual experiences with the EU, they had no choice but to interpret the 
inequality discourse in a way that opposed the EU. As a result, the 
inequality discourses shared at the international political level were adopted 
as the Brexit Idea. 
Understandably, it was an inevitable conclusion that the direction of the 
Brexit Idea was thus against not only regional integration, but also 
globalization itself. First, the opposing discourses against the EU were 
organized into Euroscepticism. The Euroscepticism was not just a feeling of 
hostility but an elaborated political idea according to which the actors 
judged their interests, preferences, and strategies. The reason that these 
Eurosceptisist actors tilted toward withdrawing from the EU was because 
they interpreted the inequality discourse in a way that the UK could protect 
its complete sovereignty and economic competitiveness only by repudiating 
the EU as a source of any inequality.  
Second, the inequality discourses were also interpreted as being 
opposed to globalization. This was because the EU had the same way of 
expanding inequality with globalization and that the globalization trend 
could be recognized in the UK’s relationships with the EU. Understanding 
inequality discourses against globalization diverged into two facets: 




Whereas the deglobalization idea remained abstract without a concrete 
political program, neonationalism materialized. This was partially indebted 
to neoprotectionist movements around the world, such as from the Trump 
administration or the Xi Jinping regime. Because the neoliberal principle 
swept the global economy, most advanced capitalism nations agreed upon a 
neoliberal rule to keep their competitiveness until the mid-2010s. Yet there 
was a transition of the international economic order with the appearance of 
two superpowers that were armed with neoprotectionism. Once again, the 
international economic system was now dominated by leaders exhaustively 
centered on national interests. Although the leverage of neoprotectionism 
has been limited, it was enough to attract other countries to look into the 
neoprotectionist order. Along the same line of thought, the UK moved 
toward protecting its national interests by keeping a safe distance from the 
EU. 
To be brief, the British actors took the inequality discourses in the 
direction of neonationalism, the foremost goal of which is to protect 
national interests under the free market order of the nation-states system. 
This neonationalism idea interacted with the neoprotectionist movement 
across the globe, constituting a main pillar of the Brexit Idea.  
In consequence, the Brexit Idea was settled in British politics by the 
interpretation and understanding of the actors who looked to the inequality 
discourses of international politics. It assumed a role as a political program, 
cognitive filter, framework of interpretation, and political paradigm. 
 
4.2.2. Characters of the Brexit Idea: Its Solidity and Fragility 
 
As suggested in section 2.4.3, ideas can be classified according to their 
 
 ９９ 
inherent features: external and internal fragility/solidity. First, the external 
fragility of ideas signifies that ideas cannot attract actors to initiate 
discourses on related institutional changes. In contrast, political actors are 
pressured to begin related discourses following an ideational axis drawn by 
externally solid ideas. Second, the internal fragility of ideas implies that 
domestic actors do not share a common understanding of the given ideas. 
The interpretation of ideas by an individual actor is thus not bound to a 
socially constructed understanding. In the case of internal fragility, political 
actors with respective understandings of ideas should compete to make their 
own understanding become accepted.  
When it comes to the relationship between the fragility of ideas and 
institutional changes, its type can be divided as well. If an idea is both 
externally and internally solid, debates relevant to the idea would surely 
occur, and the result of the debates would be fairly predictable. Otherwise, 
with externally solid but internally fragile ideas, the actors would 
necessarily discuss the related institutional changes without any expected 
course of changes. Finally, if the idea lacks external solidity, it would likely 
be because the actors do not have much interest in it.  
The Brexit Idea can also be analyzed in terms of being a feature of 
ideas. This is because the Brexit Idea belongs to a conception of idea as an 
interpretive framework for a problematic situation, interests, preferences, 
and alternative strategies. As reviewed in the previous chapter, the British 
actors came up with the Brexit Idea from the inequality discourses based on 
existing institutions and interactions during the interpretation process. 
Moreover, the Brexit Idea became an interpretive framework to understand a 
problem and interests for the national politics on Brexit because it finally 
settled as an idea in the domestic political discourse.  
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The Brexit Idea is externally solid. Its solidity was supported by 
historical legacies in British society. Historically, the UK–EU relationship 
was continuously discussed across the economic, political, and other fields. 
Accordingly, the UK–EU relationship had been established as an 
institutionalized issue, and its path dependency shored up the external 
solidity of the Brexit Idea. After globalization, the external solidity of the 
related ideas was even strengthened after the period shortly after the war. As 
the recent landscape of British political parties displays, political conflicts 
appear around the EU issue. For example, the line between the established 
two parties and the UK Independence Party as a new, and strong party was 
the EU issue in the 2019 European Parliament Election.  
As a result, the fact that the British actors discuss institutional changes 
in foreign policy is unyielding. Although if they decide to leave or stay is 
still not predicted, the Brexit issue must be the most heated controversy in 
British society. Even the Brexit Idea could be considered a source of new 
social cleavage. Similar to traditional cleavages like class, religion, region 
or so, the Brexit idea works as a determinant of an actor’s interests and as a 
confrontation against opposing social forces. Above all, political conflicts 
around the Brexit ideational axis have firmly ensconced after the late 2000s 
without the possibility for a quick reconciliation.  
Yet the most noticeable feature of the Brexit Idea is its internal fragility. 
There is no fully consented to understanding of the Brexit Idea among the 
participating actors, even a majority understanding. Whereas the Brexit Idea 
is entirely open to the political use of individual actors and furnishes 
abundant reasoning for their political behaviors, a consistent interpretation 
is not possible. However, the Brexit Idea can be used in both directions, 
either Eurosceptic or Europhile policy. This is why a host of feasible 
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interpretations are present, and they are competing in British politics. A 
specific way of the Brexit Idea was utilized since 2015, and this will be 
analyzed in the next chapter.  
Practical knowledge substantiates the internal fragile feature of the 
Brexit Idea. Although leaving the EU was determined in the 2016 
referendum and the UK is in the transition period, the withdrawal process 
did not improve after the withdrawal agreement with the EU. For instance, 
the MPs did not approve the withdrawal deal of May, and the British 
government had to ask for an extension of period. Under the situation that 
the MPs are not reaching an agreement inside the Commons, it will be tough 
for the UK to make a final decision until 2020. In other words, domestic 
politics is deadlocked when it comes to Brexit, and the current thesis 
suggests this stalemate is the result of internal fragility. Because the Brexit 
Idea allows a multitude of plausible political arguments to emerge from it, 
respective understanding and interpretations are still competing to gain the 
upper hand.  
Then, why is the Brexit Idea externally solid and internally fragile? 
Above all, the underlying phenomenon of inequality discourses is 
controversial at the international political level. Here, globalization and 
regional integration are the underlying phenomenon. Economic effects and 
the courses of development of globalization are contentious across the world, 
such as the debates on the globalization of production. Both positive and 
negative responses against globalization coexist among advanced capitalist 
European countries. Likewise, regional integration includes two ideas at the 
two extremes, doubling its ambiguity. Although regional integration is 
considered globalization of a reduced size, it may oppose worldwide 
globalization based on the desires of this regional block at the same time.  
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If the underlying phenomenon of the specific idea is contentious, ideas 
that come out of contentious factual premises are susceptible to being 
versatile or fragile. Because both globalization and regional integration as 
the underlying factual premises are controversial, the Brexit Idea that 
originated from them are internally fragile. Yet because the Brexit idea and 
its discourses cannot be left out of the social discussion for its external 
solidity, as mentioned earlier, the idea finally established social divides 
between anti-Europe and pro-Europe forces.  
In addition to the factual premise of ideas, the domestic actors and their 
behaviors can be one reason for internal fragility. Beyond the existing liberal 
or conservative coalitions, globalization and the regional integration 
reorganize new divides, and thus, the party coalition is also rearranging 
itself. The problem was that the rates of reorganization differed among the 
population and political system. The traditional party system of the UK 
seemed to fall behind in the reorganization of new divides and gathering 
political actors around the dividing lines. Because all of the established 
political coalitions failed to firmly mobilize another political actor, an 
equilibrium among arbitrary actors was formed, as shown in the result of the 
referendum as 48% stay vs. 51% leave. In other words, although many 
conventional studies argue that Brexit was determined because of the huge 
success of far-right populist, it is not plausible. Rather, all social coalitions 
were not efficient enough to utilize the Brexit Idea, and thus, a 
nondeterministic decision on the EU policy was made. In sum, unlike the 
argument of existing studies, not only the established parties but also far-
right populist parties contributed to building the internal fragility of the 
Brexit Idea by not providing a dominant interpretation of it.  
In conclusion, the Brexit Idea had to be accompanied with relevant 
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debates on foreign policy because of external solidity. This implicates new 
institutional courses that must be chosen regarding the EU policy, even if 
the UK is to stay on the same institutional path as before. Indeed, the Brexit 
Idea has an internally fragile feature as well. Although the initiation of 
Brexit discourses was clearly expected, the concrete details of the discourses 
were not predicted because the Brexit Idea still left room for arbitrary 
interpretation from all political actors. Until now, the institutional path of 




















Chapter 5. Mobilization of the Brexit Idea 
 
This chapter investigates how the Brexit Idea mobilized. As seen in 
chapter 4, inequality discourses in international politics were introduced into 
British politics in the form of the Brexit Idea with its derivative domestic 
discourses. Accordingly, there have been heated debates on the EU 
membership of the UK. This chapter describes the domestic politics of 
Brexit, emphasizing the interpretation of the Brexit Idea, competing political 
actors with an inherent political agenda in Brexit, and their detailed 
interactions. Even though these British actors shared the Brexit Idea in 
common, their political paradigms and specific behaviors were much 
differentiated following their understanding of the Brexit Idea. These 
disparate thoughts were mobilized into two major coalitions: Britain 
Stronger in the EU and Vote Leave.  
Because the Brexit Idea is internally fragile, any related political 
movements were not successful in mobilizing the population to adopt a 
specific paradigm. For instance, this is shown by the fact that approval rates 
of the two established parties gradually decreased while alternative parties 
did not gain the voters’ support to an equivalent extent. When it comes to 
the Brexit referendum, the absence of the leadership of conventional parties 
was more noticeable in that the existing party system had a small role in 
proliferating the related paradigms. Then, how was Brexit determined 
without efficient mobilization by the political parties? Was Brexit nothing 
but a coin toss? 
The current thesis argues that the Brexit decision can be attributed to 
the failure of most political coalitions in disseminating the interpretation of 
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the Brexit Idea in their favor. The narrow margin of the vote was because no 
Brexit Idea interpretation was dominant and that the practical issues 
advantageous to Brexit, including Syrian refugees, the tax evasion scandal 
of the Conservative leaders, and so forth occurred shortly before the 
referendum. Under the lack of leadership, individual actors magnified their 
understanding of the Brexit Idea, which had been proposed by a few 
political coalitions at first and who then adopted their own framework of 
interpretation. By examining British politics toward Brexit, we could 
collaterally inspect the detailed relationship between ideas and institutional 
changes. 
 
5.1. Britain Stronger in Europe vs. Vote Leave 
 
On January 23, 2013, David Cameron promised to hold an in-or-out 
referendum on EU membership before the end of 2017 and to renegotiate 
with the EU under the pressure of both left and right Eurosceptics. This 
announcement was on the condition of the Conservative Party winning the 
general election in 2015. Because the Conservative Party won the election, 
reaching a majority, the Parliament legislated the European Union 
Referendum Act, and the Cameron government started to renegotiate with 
the EU on a few controversial issues. Until then, Cameron considered a 
referendum as an opportunity to reaffirm popular support on EU 
membership. Not only the major parties, but also industry, labor, banking, 
and other major sectors, advocated to stay in the EU. After the Cameron 
government had renegotiated with the EU on securing a single market, 
restraining the inflow of immigrants, opting out from deeper integration 
 
 １０６ 
toward federation, and reducing the red-tape regulations of the EU, the 
Brexit campaign of each camp was initiated following an announcement 
date: June 23, 2016.  
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The political landscape was divided into the proremain and proleave 
sides. Among the many political campaigns to stay in the EU, Britain’s 
Stronger in Europe, mainly led by Cameron, was designated as the official 
campaign group. On the other hand, Vote Leave led by Boris Johnson, the 
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former Mayor of London, was designated as the official campaign to leave 
the EU. Not surprisingly, there were other numerous campaigns supporting 
either Britain Stronger in Europe or Vote Leave; Conservatives In, Labour in 
for Britain, Environmentalists for Europe, Greens for a Better Europe; and 
Scientists for EU for the stay side and Leave EU, Get Britain Out, 
Grassroots Out, Labour Leave, Left Leave, Trade Union and Socialist 
Coalition, Green Leaves, and Liberal Leave for the leave side. Even though 
their specific understanding of Brexit was different, they were situated along 
a confrontation line to stay versus leave.  
During an early phase of the Brexit campaign, Britain Stronger in 
Europe readily overwhelmed the counterpart because the economic cost-
benefit analysis evidently worked against Brexit. Because the expected 
economic indicators were found to be negative, the winning of the Britain 
Stronger in Europe campaign was taken for granted. Representative groups 
of the domestic coalitions also endorsed the remaining decision: for 
example, they were the Confederation of British Industries, British Bankers 
Association, British Trades Union Congress, and National Farmers Union. 
The proremain side repetitively put forward national interests as major 
evidence to stay. Yet the Vote Leave campaign turned the tables on the 
proremain by means of these very national interests. Although the proremain 
side utilized actual numbers as they were, the proleave processed economic 
cost-benefit analysis into discrete antipathy. The proleave ascribed an 
economic loss to immigrant policy and financial contributions of the EU.  
In particular, the immigrant policy emerged as a major issue for Brexit. 
The Vote Leave campaign integrated the immigrant issue with national 
interests, which ended up bringing victory to them. In detail, the proleave 
alleged that immigrants would steal jobs from the British and that massive 
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immigrants would flow in with the EU. Social coalitions such as industrial 
laborer, a radical part of the City, approved the interpretation of immigrant 
policy and national interests, which was suggested by the Vote Leave 
campaign. Not surprisingly, people with a low income, low education, and 
poor job opportunities were the main supporting groups of Vote Leave.  
Other than the intertwined immigrant and interest issue, it was about 
national sovereignty that Vote Leave campaigned for. Vote Leave argued 
that the EU, a supranational organization, might take away British 
sovereignty, leaving British voters without a voice. In other words, a 
referendum symbolized retrieving democracy back by the voters themselves, 
not the elites. A series of maladministration of the EU leadership during 
socioeconomic challenges set the cause for leaving out. It was of little 
importance whether the Brexit referendum actually held political elites 
responsible or was to develop democracy in and out of the UK. Instead, 
what mattered was the idea that Vote Leave proliferated. It was enough that 
there was a probability that British voters could improve their political 
democracy by casting their ballots on the leave.  
As a result, a majority of voters answered to leave the EU in the 
referendum, winning 51.89% to 48.11%. The referendum attracted 72.21% 
of the registered voter turnout, 65.38% of the voting age population. 
Following his promise, Cameron had to announce his resignation after the 
result came out, and Theresa May became the next Prime Minister on July 
13, 2016. Though the May government succeeded in declaring the 
withdrawal agreement with the EU, the deal was voted against by MPs three 
times. Subsequently, the British government had to ask the EU to extend a 
due date for Brexit, and October 31st became the new deadline. Yet there is 
still the task of passing the deal and to legislate the deal into the British law 
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by MPs. Until recently, Brexit has been adrift, making the hard Brexit seem 
probable.  
When compared with the prostay movement, the proleave campaign 
was a little more efficient in extending its interpretation of ideas in national 
politics. If we take a closer look, however, the principal arguments of the 
proleave group were composed of sentiments such as antipathy, fears, or 
discontent rather than discursive thoughts. Although the proleave group was 
successful in winning the referendum, its arguments were short of discursive 
factors, including logical reasoning on the cost-benefit analysis and practical 
use of main concepts such as sovereignty, democracy, globalization, and so 
on. This argument is shown in that there are still none of the dominant 
interpretations of Brexit among the proleave group despite its victory. The 
inefficiency in proliferating its own understanding on the Brexit Idea was 
noticeable during the early phase of the campaign and was strongly 
confirmed by the aftermath of the referendum. According to the current 
thesis, it is because of inefficiency in organizing the Brexit Idea that the 
stalemate of carrying out the Brexit decision came to be.  
What the proleave group suggested during the campaign could be 
equated with an obsolete and unfledged idea that was dominant shortly after 
World War II. The campaign of the Vote Leave was just to rekindle thoughts 
of the UK–EU relationship composed of nascent and vague hostility.  
The problems of the proremain group were more critical than of the 
proleave. Whereas the leave side constructed their program out of the Brexit 
Idea, the remain side continued to provide only numerical results of the 
cost-benefit analysis. That is, the proremain group not only failed to 
construct its own political paradigm using the Brexit Idea but did not even 




Both campaigns shared a basic cause of gridlock after the referendum: 
they failed to subsume interpretations of the Brexit Idea by individual actors 
into an official political program. Because a diverse understanding of Brexit 
was not decisively introduced into institutional politics, complicated issues 
regarding the relationship with the EU had to be simplified into in-or-out 
choices. A reason for these deficient discourses was the lack of leadership of 
the established political forces; they treated the Brexit issue as a strategy for 
resolving domestic political problems, excluding a diversified political 
program from the referendum. 
As mentioned earlier, ideas intrinsically are like floating resources, 
unlike socioeconomic positions or institutions. Furthermore, because the 
Brexit Idea is internally fragile because it is widely open to individual and 
voluntary interpretation, the possibility of being disposed of was increased. 
What mattered in the case of Brexit was that none of the actors were 
efficient in exploiting floating resources, in this case, the Brexit Idea. 
 
5.2. Ideas and Institutional Changes 
 
There is no linear or given path of development. The features of ideas 
and mobilization of actors during related debates are decisive in institutional 
changes. The ideas and interactions of actors lead to institutional changes 
and decide a specific path. Although many conventional descriptions 
pointed out path dependency or external crisis as a direct cause of 
institutional changes, the current thesis emphasized ideas as the most 
fundamental source of political behaviors and relevant institutional changes. 
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The present thesis focused on ideational and discursive factors rather than 
economic indicators and numbers when analyzing institutional change. In 
addition to scrutinizing the economic factors, the current thesis showed little 
importance of the demarcation between international political and domestic 
politics by highlighting the discursive interactions between the two levels. 
Indeed, international political discourses play a significant role in 
determining national political economic institutional changes through ideas 
and discourses.  
Our review of Brexit provides two important implications for the 
relationship between ideas and institutional changes. First, not all ideas are 
conducive to institutional changes, and their features determine the 
possibility and concrete direction of institutional changes. The supports for 
institutional changes spring from public deliberation on institutional 
alternatives, and public discourses often result from the external solidity of 
ideas. The Brexit Idea was able to drive Brexit because it made related 
discourses inevitable. Moreover, interpretations of the Brexit Idea did not 
stick to existing institutions or the cost-benefit analysis and was open to 
diverse actors and coalitions. This internal fragility formed the basis of the 
pro-Brexit argument in British society. In brief, we should focus on both 
ideas and their features to thoroughly investigate institutional changes.  
Second, ideas tend to slip into institutional changes as either 
strengthening or weakening the distinctiveness of political economic models. 
It is true that the thoughts of international politics can be combined with 
domestic institutions in the direction of conforming existing institutional 
paths, as is often argued by the path dependent theory. However, existing 
comparative studies have postulated too high of a threshold for institutional 
divergence. As in the case of Brexit, it is also possible that institutional 
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alternatives without continuity can be adopted without external shocks. 
Under the stop-go cycle of the UK, although the institutional path just 
before Brexit was reluctantly favorable to the EU, the Brexit decision ran 
directly counter to the integration program.  
The current thesis suggests that ideas matter the most when 
institutional reforms could bear every direction of change found in the 
prevailing political economic models. For instance, not only ideas could 
lead to the convergence of models toward a liberal market order as 
neoliberals insist, but it could also consolidate the inherent distinctiveness of 
each national economy. When it comes to the divergence of the political 
economic model, there are also three ways of divergence: each national 
economy could permanently keep its distinctive features, there could be a 
delay of the convergence toward a neoliberal market order, or a third way of 
development could be formed. That is, the current thesis considers ideas as a 
key variable of institutional changes and their direction instead of 














Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
The recent decision of Brexit challenged the current theoretical 
frameworks found in most comparative studies. Considering the path 
dependency of institutions and the absence of external shocks, the existing 
theoretical frameworks cannot adequately explain endogenous institutional 
changes that arise out of the interactions of political actors. Because many 
comparative studies assume that actors’ interests are predetermined, 
institutional changes would hence occur only when external shocks are 
encountered. Moreover, producing policy outcomes becomes complicated 
because globalization leads international politics to become directly 
involved in domestic politics. Interactions at the level of international 
politics, as well as national politics, should be considered when trying to 
explain institutional changes after globalization. Although there were a 
series of socio-economic challenges that the European countries faced after 
the 2000s, these challenges cannot be regarded as external shocks because 
they hardly altered the socio-economic or institutional position of the actors.  
Along with the rigid assumption of interests, the traditional success of 
nation-states has been assessed by economic wealth after the emergence of 
capitalism. However, focusing on an economic cost-benefit analysis alone 
left many theoretical frameworks falling short when trying to explain Brexit. 
Indeed, Brexit was opposed to the dominant economic reports suggesting 
that there would be negative impacts of Brexit on the British national 
economy.  
 Consequently, the current thesis adopted the endogenous 
institutional change theory and ideational approach to overcome two main 
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problems found in existing comparative study: overlooking the interactions 
among actors and exclusively sticking to economic variables. Instead, the 
current thesis has suggested that institutions can be changed by the 
discursive interactions among actors and ideas. Actors repeatedly interact 
through the discourses of everyday politics, and ideas are produced through 
these interactions. Then, the interpretation of ideas can be developed and 
diffused through discursive competitions. In particular, ideas can be 
formulated at the level of international politics and introduced into domestic 
politics through the interpretation of main political actors. A dominant 
interpretation of ideas can show how problem situations, interests, and 
preferences would be understood and eventually lead to the decision of the 
actors.  
 Based on the theoretical framework and by focusing on the Brexit 
Idea, the current thesis has examined how Brexit was determined. The 
Brexit Idea was formulated from the inequality discourses, which were 
shared by the European countries after they encountered socio-economic 
challenges, including the European Debt Crisis and the 2015 Refugee Crisis, 
and then produced repeated collective or individual reactions against them. 
The European countries recognized that the inequality of sovereignty and 
economy exists among member states. Based on the recognition of 
inequality, there were heated discourses on inequality that became the seed 
of the Brexit Idea in the UK. In particular, the inequality discourses that 
were introduced through the Brexit Idea had the main pillars of 
deglobalization, Euroscepticism, and neo-nationalism, fighting against the 
two megatrends of globalization and regional integration.  
 When it comes to the final decision of Brexit, it can be attributed to 
the mobilizing behaviors of the domestic coalitions and to the features of the 
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Brexit Idea. It was the proleave group that was more active in interpreting 
the Brexit Idea to a specific political paradigm. When compared with the 
prostay group, they succeeded in proliferating their interpretation of the 
Brexit Idea and made the British voters accept their interpretative 
framework. The competition around interpreting the idea was possible 
because the Brexit Idea was internally fragile. Although its external solidity 
obtained concerns from the actors in the related debates, its internal fragility 
allowed for a diversity of interpretations and understandings of the Idea.  
 How do institutions change in the era of globalization? As an 
alternative to the current theoretical frameworks, this thesis has suggested 
the revised endogenous institutional change theory, here placing importance 
on the concept of ideas. Ideas and the discursive interactions around these 
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아이디어의 형성과 동원 








본 논문은 세계화 이후 아이디어 및 담론 정치가 제도 변화를 이끄는 
양상에 집중하여 브렉시트의 원인과 전개 과정을 탐구한다.  
브렉시트를 설명하는 기존 연구들은 행위자 간 상호작용을 간과하며 
경제적 요소에 천착한다는 한계를 가진다. 대표적으로 비교역사주의 및 
신제도주의는 행위자 간 상호작용에 의한 이익 변화 가능성을 고려하지 
않음으로써 브렉시트를 적절하게 설명하지 못한다. 비교역사주의와 
신제도주의는 행위자들의 이익이 계급 및 제도에 의해 선험적으로 규정되어 
있다고 가정하였으나 실제 영국 행위자들은 계급의 재구조화 및 외적 충격 
없이 점진적으로 대외정책에 대한 이해, 이익, 선호를 변화하여 유럽연합 
탈퇴를 결정하였다. 브렉시트에 대한 경제적 손익분석 또한 실제 
행위자들의 결정을 설명하지 못하는 한계가 있다. 브렉시트로 인해 영국 
국민경제에 부정적 영향이 발생할 것으로 예상되었음에도 불구하고 
국민투표를 통하여 유럽연합 탈퇴가 결정되었기 때문이다.  
이에 본 논문은 브렉시트를 이해하기 위하여 세 가지 질문을 제기한다. 
첫째, 유럽에 대한 영국 대외정책의 독특성은 무엇인가? 둘째, 아이디어와 
 
 １２５ 
국내외 담론이 영국의 유럽연합 탈퇴를 이끌었는가? 셋째, 행위자의 담론 
상호작용 과정에서 아이디어의 특징에 기초한 동원이 어떻게 발생하였는가? 
이상의 질문에 답하기 위하여 “브렉시트 아이디어 (the Brexit Idea)”의 형성, 
확산 및 특징에 집중한다. 
먼저 유럽에 대한 영국의 대외정책 양상을 “스탑 고 패턴(a stop-go 
pattern)”으로 정의한다. 전후 영국은 전반적으로 유럽 통합에 반대하는 
움직임을 형성하는 가운데 유럽통합에의 마지못한 참여와 이로부터의 
이탈을 반복하였다. 
본 논문은 선험적으로 규정된 행위자 이익이 아니라 아이디어 및 
행위자 간 국내외 담론정치에 의하여 브렉시트가 결정되었다고 주장한다. 
2000년대 이후 유럽 국가들은 일련의 사회경제적 도전과 이에 대한 개별적, 
협력적 대응을 반복하는 과정에서 국가 간, 국내 연합 간 불평등 담론을 
공유하였다. 특히 2009년 남유럽 재정위기와 2015년 이민위기 이후 
유럽연합 내 회원국 간의 주권 불평등 및 국내 연합 간 경제적 불평등이 
두드러졌다. 유럽정치에서의 불평등담론은 회원국들로 하여금 세계화 및 
신자유주의라는 메가 트렌드에 반하여 네오내셔널리즘 (neonationalism), 
유럽연합회의주의 (Euroscepticism), 탈세계화 (Deglobalization)라는 이해를 
공유하도록 하였으며 이는 영국의 유럽연합 탈퇴를 이끌었다.  
나아가 본 논문은 아이디어의 “내적, 외적 허약성(internal and external 
fragility)”의 관점에서 브렉시트 아이디어를 분석한다. 브렉시트 아이디어는 
외적 견고성으로 인하여 관련 담화와 행위의 발생을 필수불가결하게 만드는 
동시에 내적 허약성으로 인하여 지배적인 이해의 틀을 제공하지는 못한다. 
이로 인해 문제 상황과 행위자 이익의 이해가 개별 행위자 및 행위자 집단 
간 국내 정치적 경쟁에 의하여 발생하였다. 그러므로 본 논문은 브렉시트 
찬성 연합이 브렉시트 아이디어의 이해 틀을 확산하는 데 효과적이었기 
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